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SUMMARY
In markets where suppliers experience learning by doing over time or, more generally,
economies of scale in production, buyers are auctioning off longer-term contracts with an
eroding price policy. Under an eroding price contract, the buyer initially competitively
awards production to the lowest-bid supplier via an auction. Before the auction takes place,
the buyer makes it clear to the suppliers that, if chosen, a sequence of price reductions will
be mandatory in subsequent periods.
In this thesis, we mainly study the design of the optimal eroding price contract in a two
period setting under three different model settings : (1) Every supplier faces a new cost in
each period (NLI model : chapter 3), (2) The supplier who wins the auction in the first
period locks-in his cost for the future, and the buyer makes the future payment based on
the winning supplier’s current bid (LI1 : chapter 4), and (3) The supplier who wins the
auction in the first period locks-in his cost for the future, and the buyer makes the future
payment based on the winning supplier’s actual cost (LI1 : chapter 5). Under NLI setting,
the magnitude of the cost reduction due to learning by doing is common knowledge, while
the magnitude is uncertain under LI1 and LI2 settings. We also study the optimal reserve
prices in sequential independent auctions under NLI setting (chapter 6).
We go on to compare the performance of the eroding price policy against sequential
independent auctions (without or with the optimal reserve prices) under the above model
settings. Via analytical and numerical comparisons, we find that even in the presence of
learning by doing/economies of scale in production, a buyer is often better off running
sequential auctions with a reserve price, rather than limiting competition and contracting




Since the concept of an “online procurement (reverse) auction” emerged in the mid-1990’s,
it has become an increasingly popular and powerful tool for outsourcing. Success stories at
Hewlett-Packard(Mohara et al.[32]), Motorola(Arensman[3], Minahan[31], Metty et al.[30]),
and Volkswagon (Beall et al.[6]), to name a few, have grabbed the attention of procurement
managers across industries attempting to identify ways to reduce costs. One clear lesson
that has emerged from the use of auctions in a variety of markets is that ‘one size does
not fit all’. Auction makers must take into account the characteristics of the market in
designing their auction.
For example, in the automotive industry, which has been an early adopter of B2B
auctions, it is very common that each customer has his own design specifications even for
pseudo-commodity products, such as leather car seats. Under such settings, a supplier
frequently can not use the same production line for two different customers due to different
design engineering spec, e.g., colors, leather quality, number of wrinkles, etc. As a result,
the supplier must incur a buyer-specific set-up cost to design the production line to meet
the customer’s specific demands. In addition, as the supplier (and often the buyer) learns
more about the buyer’s likes/dislikes as well as the process of the production, he is able
to produce the good more efficiently and cost effectively. In markets such as this, where
suppliers experience learning by doing over time or, more generally, economies of scale in
production, buyers are auctioning off longer-term contracts with an eroding price (a.k.a.
cascading price) policy (see table 1.1 for examples). Under an eroding price contract, a
buyer awards a multi-period contract where the price paid to the supplier declines over
time at a prespecified rate. The elements of a long-term contract, where a supplier is
guaranteed a buyer’s business, or is at least given the right of first refusal, combined with
a pre-specified declining price are thought to be effective in identifying a win-win situation
1
for both the buyer and winning supplier.
Table 1.1: Examples of Commodities auctioned via eroding price contract
Category Commodity
Electronics PCA/PCBs, cables/assemblies, capacitors,
transformers/transducers, wire harnesses
monitors, sockets, transceivers
Engineering & Construction compressor reblading
Metals fasteners, fabrication/stamping, flanges,
regulators, steel tubes, valve assembly
high volumed machined parts,
MRO & Services contact center, copiers, janitor services,
office supplies, temporary labor services,
branch automation deployment, uniforms
Paper & Packaging bulk bags, corrugated packaging, labels
folding cartons
Plastics decorative plastics, molded and die cut EPS,
vertical injection molding
closures, seals/Gaskets
Raw Materials molded/extruded rubber components
While the benefits and advantage of such a procurement mechanism may at first seem
intuitive, we are unaware of any work that has (i) studied the optimal design of the eroding
price contract and/or (ii) demonstrated that an eroding price contract is more cost effective
than alternative popular procurement methods. This thesis mainly aims to further our un-
derstanding of the appropriateness of eroding price contracts under various market settings.
We assume that the buyer faces the same N potential suppliers in each period, and compare
the performance of eroding price contracts (EPC) against sequential independent auctions
(SI) under two cost frameworks,
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• No-Lock-In (NLI): Every supplier faces a new cost in each period. This assumption is
reasonable when the duration between bidding periods is long or technology and industry
environment changes fast (e.g., the electronics industry); under such a scenario a supplier
may experience changes in its own subcontractors, price of raw materials, financial situation,
etc, and find itself with altered costs in the next bidding round.
• Lock-In (LI): The supplier who wins the auction at T = 1 ‘locks-in’ his (baseline)
cost for the future; all other suppliers redraw their costs at T = 2. This setting reflects
a situation where the winning supplier is able to use his newly won contract to write a
contract to lock-in his own input prices.1
Besides the design of the eroding price contract and its performance, we explore char-
acterizing the optimal reserve prices in sequential auctions. By this, we can evaluate the
optimal eroding price contract by comparing with the sequential auctions with the optimal
reserve prices.
Chapter 1.1 gives an overview of the relevant literature; we discuss our models and
assumptions in chapter 2 . Using game-theoretic methods, we study the equilibrium behav-
ior of suppliers under EPC and SI, and compare their performance under the NLI setting
(chapter 3) and LI settings (chapter 4 and 5). In chapter 6, we study the optimal reserve
prices under SI (as a complementary of the optimal eroding price schedule under EPC). We
conclude our thesis with future directions for research in chapter 7.
1.1 Literature Review
Learning by doing can be more generally interpreted as a positive synergy (or complemen-
tarity) over a bundle of goods, where the cost of a bundle of goods is less than the sum of
the costs of the goods individually. Von der Fehr and Riis[43], Grimm[15], Jeitschko and
Wolfstetter[16], Menezes and Monteiro[29], Sorensen[40] study how the presence of syner-
gies impacts equilibrium bidding behavior and the auctioneer’s profit. Similar to the model
we adopt, they allow bidders to supply more than one unit and assume that the winner
1Under symmetric and strictly monotonically increasing bid functions at T = 1, the incumbent supplier
would always be the least cost supplier at T = 2 if suppliers who lost at T = 1 kept the same costs across
both periods; hence, we ignore this simple case.
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in the first auction has a cost advantage over the losers in the subsequent auction. All,
with the exception of Von der Fehr and Riis[43], assume a NLI cost setting, and hence
assume that the costs in the first and the subsequent auction are independent. Von der
Fehr and Riis[43] and Jeitschko and Wolfstetter[16] study the effect of the future market
opportunities on the bidding behavior and the auctioneer’s selling price in the first and the
subsequent auctions, while Grimm[15] and Menezes and Monteiro[29] compare the perfor-
mance of a bundle auction with sequential independent auctions. Sorensen[40] suggests the
methodology to design the optimal mechanism in such a setting (See table 1.2 for detailed
model settings of those papers). Our work deviates from their studies in two important
ways: We introduce and study the optimal design of eroding price contracts2 and extend
the analysis of eroding price contracts and sequential independent auctions to a LI setting;
Von der Fehr and Riis[43] also considers this case, but focus only on sequential auctions.
Motivated by the Federal Communication Commission’s sale of spectrum bandwidth via
simultaneous ascending auctions, Krishna and Rosenthal[20] study the bidding behavior of
global and local bidders in a sequential multi-unit 2nd price auction, where a local bidder has
positive value for only one (particular) object while a global bidder has positive synergies
associated with winning more than one object. the global bidder’s valuation from winning
only one object is x, while his value from winning two objects is 2x+α, where x is i.i.d. and
α is a known constant shared by all the global bidders. A key characteristic of these papers
is that local bidders participate in only one of the auctions, i.e., the global bidder faces a
new set of locals in each auction and it is a (weakly) dominant strategy for a local to bid
his true valuation in each auction. Elmaghraby[13]; she considers an extension of Krishna
and Rosenthal[20] where the same set of local bidders can participate in both auctions. In
contrast, this thesis considers a setting where all of bidders are global bidders, and hence
2There are literatures which also have studied the design of the optimal two-periods contracts in different
stream rather than auction theory. Baron and Besanko[5] and Courty and Li[9] share a similar feature with
our eroding price contract in the sense that agents learn their costs(or values) over time, but the contracts
are signed at T = 1 ; Baron and Besanko[5] study the optimal “regulatory” policy where firms knows only
their costs at T = 1 at the timing of the contract, and later they learn costs at T = 2 (i.e., the costs may
independent or correlated), and Courty and Li[9] study the optimal “price discrimination” for a monopolist
where consumers consumers learn their actual values after the contract (i.e., they only knows the distribution
of their values at T = 1).
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Table 1.2: Literatures on Sequential Auctions with Synergies
Value Distribution Synergy Focus
Literature of bidders of having in
(2-periods) two objects studies
Menezes & Same values at d(v)§ = v1 + v2 + α : Price trends in SI
Monteiro T = 1 & 2 α > (<)0 Comparisons between
(1999) BA and SI
Jeitschko & 2-points distribution, Incumbent & entrant Price trends in SI
Wolfstetter {0, v} have different Comparison between
(2002) same at T = 1 & 2 probability of first- and second-price
having v auction
Vonder Fehr Distribution at T = 2 Incumbent or entrants Price trends in SI
& Riis is conditional on retain their value
(2003) the value at T = 1 at T = 2
Grimm Incumbent & entrants d(v) = v1 + v2 + α : Comparisons between
(2003) redraw their costs α > 0 BA and SI
at T = 2 (in procurement)
FE(v) ≺FSD FI(v)
Sorensen Incumbent & entrants d(v) = v1 + v2 + α : Optimal SI
(2003) redraw their costs α > 0
at T = 2
§ d(v) : utility of owing two objects of a bidder
Incumbent : a winner at T = 1
Entrant : a loser at T = 1 or new participant at T = 2
BA : Bundle auction
SI : Sequential Independent Auction
all of the bidders can participate in both auctions, although only one will experience a cost
reduction.
A growing number of papers consider the design of procurement strategies in a dynamic
setting (please see Elmaghraby[11] for an overview of the literature). Many of the papers
that have studied repeated procurements are mainly concentrated on the Defense of De-
partment (DoD) procurement. DoD procurement is often comprised of multiple stages,
encompassing concept design, R&D, initial production, and full production, and typically
any cost reductions brought about by the incumbent are transferred to any new suppliers.
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Rob[37], Anton and Yao[1], Riordan and Sappington[36], and Laffont and Tirole[22] address
the government’s procurement strategy and discuss how the buyer can extract optimal ef-
fort from the developer (i.e., the selected supplier) in the R&D stage under asymmetric
information and experience (i.e., only the supplier knows his cost). In contrast, we focus on
repeat procurement in a setting where the product(s) to be supplied are well-defined (i.e.,
the buyer is not concerned with R&D) and where the learning advantage of the existing
supplier is not transferable to other suppliers.
Motivated by DoD procurement (but not limited to it), however, Lewis and Yildirim[25]
study the optimal procurement design when the buyer procures from one of two suppliers
in the infinite time horizon under the short term commitment. Each supplier has his finite
learning curve and he experiences the cost reduction during his learning curve. Under such
setting, the buyer balances the cost reduction from learning by doing against reduction of
competition if one supplier become dominant in the market by solving Markov-Perfect equi-
librium. They find that the buyer tends to switches suppliers when the learning economies
are small, and the rate of the learning is too slow due to the buyer’s preference for balanced
competition among suppliers. Again, their main focus is limited to the short term contract.
Klotz and Chatterjee[19] study the design of two sequential auctions when the buyer
wishes to dual sourcing (there are only two potential suppliers in this market and the
buyer wishes to purchase from both). Both suppliers incur a cost for submitting a bid,
and experience learning by doing cost reductions (depending on the quantity produced).
To induce competition in each period, the buyer guarantees each supplier a portion of her
business in the first period, and allow the suppliers to compete for the remainder. They
conclude that dual sourcing is more effective when the buyer can not commit to a long term
contract or the bidders can not buy-in to the future gain.
Under a static framework which does not consider possible shifts in supplier costs due
to learning by doing/economies of scale, Bulow and Klemperer[8] argue that a buyer is
always better off maximizing the number of bidders (Corollary 1, pg. 189) and hence a
buyer should not favor procurement mechanisms where she ‘locks-in’ to a single supplier in
return for the supplier offering her a more competitive price. They consider a framework
6
where a seller faces N + 1 buyers; the bidders’ valuations can be either independent or
affiliated (but are symmetric). Bulow and Klemperer compare the performance of two
selling mechanisms; (i) an English auction with N bidders and a take-it-or-leave-it price
offered to the last remaining bidder (where the take-it-or-leave-it price is determined after
the seller has had the opportunity to gather information from the bidding process) and (ii)
an English auction with one more bidder, N + 1, but without any additional negotiation
stage. Under this setting, they prove that one additional bidder always yields a higher
expected revenue to the seller than any negotiation process with one less bidder. This





A buyer wishes to procure Q units of a good in each of two time periods. The buyer wishes
to sole source in each period, and incurs a switching cost of s if she switches suppliers at
T = 2. A switching cost may occur due to the cost of running a new auction, training the
new supplier about characteristics specific to that buyer and/or the cost of moving parts
or changing tooling from the incumbent supplier to a new supplier. The buyer faces N ≥ 3
potential suppliers: We assume that all N suppliers have been pre-qualified to participate
in the auction, i.e., they all adequately meet the buyer’s demand specifications, and have
sufficient production capacity to fill the buyer’s entire order. Thus, the buyer’s sole criterion
when selecting a supplier is price. Given the suppliers’ adequate capacity, we can assume
without loss of generality, that Q = 1.
A supplier t’s cost at time T is given by tT , for T = 1, 2. We assume that each bidder’s
cost at time T is private information and is drawn independently from a continuous and
differentiable distribution. At T = 1, each bidder’s cost is drawn from the same distribution
F (t1) : F (C) = 0, F (C +1) = 1, C > 0 with a corresponding density f(t1). We assume that
f(t1) is strictly positive anywhere on [C,C + 1].
A supplier who is not selected at T = 1 is referred to as an entrant at T = 2, and redraws
his (privately known) cost at T = 2, t2E from the same (original) common distribution
function F (see figure 2.1). We refer to the supplier who fulfills the buyer’s demand at
T = 1 as the incumbent supplier. After supplying the buyer for one period, the incumbent
supplier experiences “learning by doing”, which translates into a reduction in his production
cost at T = 2. We assume that the maximum possible amount of cost reduction is same
for all bidder types and given by α (we consider relaxing this assumption in chapter 4.4.2).
α is assumed to be small relative to C so that C − α ≥ 0 (without loss of generality, we
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Figure 2.1: Costs at T = 1 and T = 2
t2I . In this thesis, we study two different cost structures for the incumbent: (1) Under the
No-Lock-In (NLI) setting, the incumbent’s cost at T = 2, t2I , is drawn from the distribution
FI(t2I) : F (C−α) = 0, F (C+1−α) = 1, which shifts downward by α from F . (2) Under the
Lock-In (LI) setting, the incumbent’s cost at T = 2 is drawn from the distribution FI(t2I) :
F (t1 − α) = 0, F (t1) = 1 (see figure 2.1).
We can consider that the incumbent’s cost at T=2 is composed of two elements : his
baseline production cost and learning effect cost. Under NLI setting, the magnitude of the
learning effect cost is a common knowledge (= α), while the transitory cost at T = 2 is
uncertain (i.e., drawn from the distribution F ). In contrast, under LI setting, the magnitude
of the learning effect is uncertain (i.e., drawn from range of [0, α]), while his baseline
production cost is known by the first auction (= t1). That is, the supplier locks-in his
transitory cost, but possibly can reduce his cost from learning by doing effect which is
uncertain at T = 1.
It is important to emphasize that this type of cost reduction occurs as a result of
production (e.g., worker familiarity and experience with the production process) during
T = 1 and is not the result of any cost-reducing measures that the supplier may under-
take, such as upgrading equipment, educating workers, etc. The potential for learning by
doing can be quite substantial in some industries: NASA hosts a learning curve calcu-





























Figure 2.2: Procurement Mechanisms
cost savings arising from climbing the learning curve to be 15% in aerospace, up to 20% in
shipbuilding and up to 25% in repetitive electrical operations.
We assume that all participants are risk-neutral and maximize(minimize) their expected
profits(costs) and that N is common knowledge. Furthermore, we assume that suppliers
behave rationally and they take into account expected future profit streams when deter-
mining their optimal bids at T = 1. The buyer (credibly) commits herself in advance to
a procurement mechanism, i.e., a set of allocation policies and payment contracts. In this
thesis, we describe and compare two different types of procurement mechanisms that are
currently being used in B2B auctions: (1) an Eroding price contract with conditional com-
mitment (EPC), and (2) Sequential independent auctions (SI). Without loss of generality,
we focus on direct mechanisms, whereby suppliers bid by reporting a cost(type), which may
differ from their true cost. The winner is selected based on the reported cost and the buyer
uses the suppliers’ reported types in designing her optimal eroding price schedule.
2.1 Procurement Mechanisms
Mechanism 1: Eroding Price Contract (EPC) (see figure 2.2) When it is common
knowledge that a supplier may experience some learning by doing and hence a reduction
in production costs at T = 2, some buyers wish to use a long-term contract to exert some
control over the price that they pay at T = 2 and ask their suppliers to adhere to an
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eroding price contract. Under an eroding price contract, the buyer holds an auction at
T = 1 to select a supplier and each supplier simultaneously submits a bid indicating the
amount he wishes to be paid per unit at T = 1. The lowest bidding supplier is awarded
the buyers’ business at T = 1 and is paid the lowest rejected price (Vickrey auction)1.
However, the buyer announces upfront a price schedule to which the winning supplier must
adhere. That is, before the auction at T = 1, the buyer announces an eroding price schedule
R(B1EPC(t
1)) which states, for each submitted bid at time T = 1, the price the supplier will
be paid at T = 2. Under strictly monotonically increasing bid functions, Myerson’s direct
revelation principle implies that we can model the eroding price schedule as a function of
a supplier’s true type, i.e., R(B1EPC(t
1)) = R(t1)). We assume that R(t1) is in the range of
the incumbent’s cost, i.e., R(t1) ∈ [C−α,C +1−α] ∀ t1 under NLI, and R(t1) ∈ [t1−α, t1]
∀ t1 under LI. This implies that the buyer does not consider prices that are guaranteed to
make the supplier unprofitable at T = 2 or pay the supplier more than his possible highest
cost.
Under EPC, the incumbent supplier is given the option to reject R(t1) after he has
observed his cost at T = 2. If the incumbent decides to reject R(t1) , then the buyer
holds a second (Vickrey) auction with the remaining N − 1 suppliers at T = 2, where the
incumbent is not invited to participate in the second auction. The rationale for excluding
the incumbent is as follows: If the incumbent cannot participate in a second auction, then
it is optimal for him to accept R(t1) if R(t1) > t2I and reject it otherwise. If the incumbent
were not excluded from the second auction, then he would have the incentive to trade-off
his profit under R(t1) with his expected profit from participating in the second auction, and
may not accept R(t1) even if it is profitable. Under EPC, each supplier has two decision
variables; his bid at T = 1 and his bid at T = 2 if he should lose at T = 1 and the incumbent
should reject the contract at T = 2.
1The most common auction format adopted by FreeMarkets is an open descending price auction. Under
this format, the winning bidder is paid the price at which his last opponent drops out of the auction. It
is well-known that a Vickrey auction and an open-auction yield the same outcome in the single unit case
(Myerson[34]). We use a Vickrey auction as a stylistic representation of the open ascending auction format,
with the acknowledgment that the two formats may not lead to the same equilibrium bidding behavior under
our modeling assumptions. The strategic and revenue equivalence of the two auction formats remains an
open research question.
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Mechanisms 2 : Sequential Independent Auctions (SI) (see figure 2.2) Under
SI auctions, the buyer prefers to maintain short-term contracts with her suppliers, i.e., she
commits to a supplier for only one period, and selects the winning supplier in each period
via a Vickrey auction. The buyer uses information gathered in the first auction to set a
reserve price at T = 2; if B1SI(t
1) is the winning bid at T = 1, the buyer sets the reserve
price at T = 2, r2 to be the incumbent’s highest possible cost at T = 2, i.e., r2 = C + 1−α
under NLI and r2 = t1 under LI2.
Note that under NLI, the incumbent’s highest cost at T = 2 is the same regardless of the
type of winning supplier at T = 1 (= C + 1− α). Thus, the reserve price is deterministic,
i.e., a supplier’s strategic behavior at T = 1 is irrelevant to buyer’s choice of the reserve
price. However, under LI, the reserve price is based on the auction at T = 1 (i.e., different
reserve price according to different type of winning supplier at T = 1). Under such a setting,
the supplier may be inclined to affect the buyer’s choice of the reserve price strategically
when he submits his bid at T = 1, from which he may take advantage of some information
rent. Or, if the buyer is able to audit the supplier’s cost after the production and becomes
known his actual cost, the supplier’s bid at T = 1 may not affect the buyer’s selection of
the reserve price. In this thesis, we consider both cases and compare the differences :
LI1 : the buyer sets the reserve price based on the winning bid B1SI(t
1).
LI2 : the buyer sets the reserve price based on the incumbent’s actual cost at T = 1, t1.
It is common in SI auctions for the buyer to announce upfront that she will not switch
suppliers unless the cost savings from an alternative supplier are greater than the cost of
switching. Under SI, the buyer adds on the switching cost s to each submitted bid by an
entrant at T = 2 to derive an effective bid for each entrant (note that the submitted bid
and effective bid are the same for the incumbent supplier). If, given the effective bids, the
lowest cost bidder is an entrant, then the buyer will pay him the second lowest effective
bid minus s; if an incumbent is selected then she pays him an amount equal to min[reserve
2As we will mention later, we find the strictly monotonically increasing B1(t1), and hence the buyer is
able to infer the bidder type t1 from his bid.
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price, the second lowest effective bid] 3. We define FE to be the entrants’ ‘adjusted’ cost
distribution with support [C + s, C + 1 + s], i.e., FE(C + s) = 0, FE(C + 1s) = 1.








Table 2.1 summarizes the strategy space in each of the two mechanisms. We use BTM (t
T )
to denote the bidding strategy used by supplier t under procurement mechanism M in the
T th auction. Given the frequent use of these two mechanisms, we pose and answer the
following two questions:
• What is the optimal eroding price schedule R(t1) under EPC?
• Can an eroding price contract outperform standard auctions, by yielding the buyer a
lower expected total procurement cost?
In this thesis, we consider three different models (NLI, LI1 and LI2) according to the
market environments where the buyer would face. Table 2.2 and figure 2.3 show these differ-
ent market environments in each model (explained in further detail in each corresponding
chapter; NLI is discussed in Chapter 3, LI1 and LI2 are discussed in Chapter 4 and 5,
respectively).
Besides the comparisons between EPC and SI under various model settings, we observe
the optimal reserve prices under SI (in NLI market setting) in chapter 6 (see figure 2.3).
We will explain the details of the optimal reserve prices under SI when we go to the chapter
6.
3For example, if s = 2, the incumbent’s bid at T = 2 is equal to 10, and the first and second lowest
submitted bids from entrants are 6 and 9 respectively, then an entrant wins and is paid 8 (=10 - 2). Note that
this payment rule can result in the buyer paying more than the second lowest submitted bid to a winning
incumbent at T = 2. For example, if s = 2, the reserve price at T = 2 is 10, the lowest submitted bid from
entrants is 9 and the incumbent’s bid is 7; then the incumbent will win and be paid 10 (although the second
lowest submitted bid is 9, the effective bid is 11). We adopt this payment rule for the sake of consistency.
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Table 2.2: Different Settings under NLI, LI1, and LI2
Model NLI LI1 LI2
Assumptions (chapter 3) (chapter 4) (chapter 5)
Suppliers’ costs at T = 2 No-Lock-in Lock-in (incumbent only)
Incumbent’s cost t2I [C − α, C + 1− α] [t1 − α, t1]§
Entrant’s cost t2E [C, C + 1] [C, C + 1]
Future (Reserve) based on supplier’s based on supplier’s
Price bid at T = 1 actual cost at T = 1
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What is the optimal eroding price schedule under EPC?
Which one, EPC or SI does minimize the buyer’s cost?
Figure 2.3: Scheme of the procurement mechanisms studied in this thesis
14
We first consider the NLI setting in next chapter 3. We solve for the suppliers’ equi-
librium bids and then go on to compare the buyer’s expected costs under EPC and SI,
respectively. We then perform a similar analysis for the LI1 and LI2 settings in chapter 4
and 5.
2.2 Equilibrium Bidding Strategy at T = 2
Before we proceed to analyze the NLI, LI1 and LI2 settings, we make the following obser-
vation that is valid under all settings. The 2nd price nature of the auctions simplifies the
search for the bidders’ optimal bidding behaviors in the last auction: Vickrey[42] demon-








t2I , if t is an incumbent
t2E if t is an entrant
(2.1)
The assumption of 2nd price auctions allows us to focus our attention on the bidding
behavior in the first auction, B1M (t
1). Note that the 2nd price nature of the auctions also
implies that the bidders do not use any information gathered after the first auction under
SI or EPC strategically when submitting a second bid; i.e., the information flow that occurs
under SI and EPC does not affect bidding behavior at T = 2. In equilibrium, each supplier
will adopt a strategy that maximizes his expected profit conditional on what strategies he
believes his opponents are using. Given the symmetry in beliefs at T = 1, it is natural to
posit that two suppliers of the same type will bid the same in equilibrium. Hence, we focus
our attention on symmetric equilibrium bidding functions that are continuous and strictly
monotonically increasing in type.
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CHAPTER III
PROCUREMENT MECHANISMS UNDER NO LOCK-IN
SETTING (NLI)
3.1 Model
We begin by first considering a model where the incumbent’s baseline cost at T = 2 is
independent of his cost at T = 1.
• Suppliers’ costs at T = 2 : every supplier faces a new cost in each period. Thus, in-
cumbent does not lock-in his cost at T = 2 same as entrants.
• Incumbent’s cost t2I distribution : the incumbent’s cost at T = 2 is drawn from the
distribution FI(t2) : F (C − α) = 0, F (C + 1− α) = 1.
• Possible value of R(t1) : R ∈ [C − α, C + 1 − α] ∀ t1. That is, the buyer does not
consider the price that is guaranteed to make the supplier unprofitable at T = 2
(R < C−α) or pay the supplier more than his possible highest cost (R > C +1−α)1.
• Setting of future price : reserve price under SI are set to be C + 1 − α, i.e. the
incumbent’s possible highest cost at T = 22.
Figure 3.1 shows the cost distributions of suppliers in each period.
3.2 Equilibrium Bidding Strategies under EPC and SI
Under NLI setting, any supplier at T = 1 faces the same expected profit as an incumbent
or an entrant at T = 2. As a result, we have our first observation.
OBSERVATION 3.1. Under NLI, it is optimal for the buyer to offer all suppliers the
same price, R, at T = 2, i.e., R(t1) = R ∀t1.
1Even if we relax the assumption, the optimal solution does not change.
2Since α is common knowledge, the timing of the announcement of the reserve price does not affect to
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Figure 3.1: Costs at T = 1 and T = 2 under NLI
To obtain the buyer’s expected total costs, we must identify the supplier’s equilibrium
bidding strategies under each mechanism.
PROPOSITION 3.1. In combination with the second period bids outlined in equation
(2.1), the following constitutes a subgame perfect equilibrium bidding strategy under EPC,
B1EPC(t





















Proof. see appendix A.1.
We use F(i:j) to denote the distribution of the ith lowest order statistics out of j suppliers.
The ability of the incumbent supplier to reject R at T = 2 has two opposing effects on a
supplier’s bid at T = 1: (1) the supplier is guaranteed to have a non-negative profit as an
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incumbent at T = 2 and hence the supplier always shades his bid by this expected non-
negative profit given R (E[Π2EPC(t
2
I);R]); and (2) if he loses at T = 1, the supplier has the
opportunity to bid again with a new set of costs as an entrant (possibly higher or lower




that all suppliers draw their expected costs at T = 2 from the same distributions FI and F
implies that they all shade/inflate their bids by the same amount.
When R or(and) α increases, the supplier’s expected profit as an incumbent (E[Π2EPC(t
2
I);R])
increases, but his expected profit as an entrant (E[Π2EPC(t
2
E);R]) decreases as a result of
it being less likely that, should he lose at T = 1, an opponent would reject R at T = 2.
The supplier’s profit as an incumbent does not change as N increases, while his profit as
an entrant decreases because of the decreasing difference between his bid and the second
lowest entrant’s bid. This, in turn, exerts a downward pressure on his bid. Note that s does
not appear in B1EPC(t
1); if an auction takes place at T = 2, it is only after the incumbent
has rejected R and involves only entrants.4
PROPOSITION 3.2. In combination with the second period bids outlined in equations






if α + s ≥ 1,
t1 − [r2 − E[t2I ]],































3Under the uniform distribution, the supplier t will always submit his bid below his cost since the positive
gains as an incumbent at T = 2 dominates the gains as an entrant(E[Π2EPC(t
2






4As we will see in the next section, the optimal R is increasing in s. Thus, s also indirectly affects the
bidding behavior of bidder t.
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where r2 = C + 1− α (reserve price)
Proof. see appendix B.1.
The incentives for bid shading and inflating are similar under SI and EPC. The oppor-
tunity to participate in the second auction with a (possibly) reduced cost after experiencing
learning by doing as an incumbent supplier incents a supplier to shade his bid (E[Π2SI(t
2
I)]).
However, the opportunity to participate with a new cost at T = 2 incents a supplier to
inflate his bid (E[Π2SI(t
2
E)]). The incentive to shade dominates the incentive to inflate, and
hence the equilibrium bid is always below t1 (please see appendix B.3). If α+s ≥ 1 (i.e., the
incumbent’s cost at T = 2 is always less than or equal to the minimum possible entrant’s
cost), there is no chance for a supplier to lose at T = 1 and then win at T = 2, and hence
there is no inflation effect on his bid at T = 1. As with EPC, all cost types shade their bids
by the same amount.
3.3 Expected Total Cost and the Optimal Eroding Price R
Given the equilibrium bids derived in the propositions 3.1 and 3.2, we are one step away
from comparing the performance of each procurement mechanism. While the expected costs
associated with SI are completely determined by the suppliers’ bids, EPC requires the buyer
to select an eroding price R (see table 3.1 below). We use x(i:j) to denote the ith lowest
order statistic out of j random draws, and P1 to denote the probability that the incumbent
supplier accepts R at T = 2, i.e., P1 = FI(R) (P0 = 1− P1).
Table 3.1: Expected total cost in each procurement mechanism.
Mechanism Expected Total Cost (ETC)
EPC ETCEPC(R) = E[B1EPC(t
1)(2:N)] + P1 ×R + P0 × E[B2EPC(t2)(2:N−1) + s]




§B̃2SI(t2)(2:N) is the effective bid : if an entrant defines the payment, B̃2SI(t2)(2:N) = B2SI(t2)(2:N) +s
PROPOSITION 3.3. Under EPC, the buyer’s optimal choice of R∗ is as follows.
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, if R∗ = R̂
(3.5)
Proof. see appendix A.2.5
R has two opposite effects on the buyer’s expected total cost, a decrease in R decreases
the buyer’s payment at T = 2, but increases her payment at T = 1 (due to an increase
in the bids at T = 1, as described in proposition 3.1). The optimal R balances these two
effects.6 It is interesting to note that R̂ is not a function of α; this is because the factors that
influence R̂ are the potential profits as an entrant(E[Π2EPC(t
2
E)]) as well as the expected
cost from an auction with only entrants (E[t2E(2:N−1) +s]), neither of which are impacted by
α. R̂ can be considered the (direct and indirect) cost of the buyer if she runs an additional




E(2:N−1) +s] arise only when the incumbent rejects
R̂ (with the probability of 1− FI(R̂)). That is, the buyer offers to her incumbent the price






E); R]. The former is the expected profit






6For example, consider a setting where R∗ = R̂ < C + 1 − α; suppose that the buyer sets R∗ > R̂, i.e.







K = E[t2E(2:N−1) + s], as a result of a lower bids at T = 1, but the expected cost at T = 2 increases by
εFI(R̂ + ε) + K
∫ R̂+ε
R̂
fI(x)dx. Since FI(x) is a strictly increasing function, the increase in cost at T = 2 is
larger than the decrease in cost at T = 1. Similarly, if the buyer sets R∗ = R̂− ε, the increasing amount of
aggressiveness of bid at T = 1 (
∫ R̂
R̂−ε FI(x)dx + K
∫ R̂
R̂−ε fI(x)dx) becomes larger than the decreasing amount




which is equal to the cost in case that the incumbent rejects it (not just the direct price
from the second auction from entrants, but also the price increased by the second auction
by the rejection of the incumbent).7
We can make the following observation,
OBSERVATION 3.2. R∗ = R̂ is a sufficient condition for α + s < 1.
Proof. From equation (3.4), we can rewrite R̂ = Γ + C + s, where Γ is a positive term (this
follows since both integrals in equation (3.4) are positive; furthermore, the second integral
represents the expected second lowest order statistic in the range of [C +s, C +s+1], which
is greater than C + s). We have that R̂ = Γ + C + s < C + 1− α ⇒ α + s < 1− Γ < 1.
Given the optimal R∗, the buyer’s expected total cost is composed of her payment to the
supplier for the first unit of the good (E[t1(2:N)]) and the cost for the second unit (E[t
2
I ]−Ψ ).
The last term −Ψ = ∫ C+1−αR∗ (R∗ − x) fI(x)dx, is a negative term and can be interpreted as
the expected reduction in procurement cost when the incumbent rejects the R∗ at T = 2 and
an entrant supplies the buyer. When the potential entrant pool is relatively uncompetitive
(this adjective describes a market when N is small, and/or α and s are large), the buyer
does not wish to expose herself to a second auction. Hence she sets R∗ = C + 1 − α and
keeps the same supplier for both periods, and Ψ = 0. However, as the entrant pool becomes
competitive (N increases, and/or α and s decrease), the buyer will find it optimal to reduce
R below C + 1− α and reduce her costs by Ψ.
PROPOSITION 3.4. Given the bidding strategy as in proposition 3.2, the expected total
cost of the buyer under SI is as follows.
7When R̂ < C + 1− α, the buyer can lower her cost at T = 2 even if the incumbent rejects R̂ at T = 2,
































Proof. see appendix B.2.
In contrast to EPC, the buyer always conducts a second auction with all N suppliers at
T = 2 under SI. As described for EPC, the chance to participate in the auction at T = 2
incents a supplier to inflate his bid, and this exactly translates into the cost of the buyer
(Φ2 = E[Π2SI(t
2
E)]). However, the second auction with N bidders offers the buyer a chance
to procure from a more competitive entrant at T = 2 without sacrificing a reduction in the
number of bidders, which is captured in Φ1.8
Given the buyer’s expected total cost under the two mechanisms, we are now ready to
compare the performances of the two mechanisms.
PROPOSITION 3.5. When α+s ≥ 1, the buyer’s expected total costs are the same under
EPC and SI.
Proof. We prove that α + s ≥ 1 is a sufficient condition of R∗ = C + 1 − α. Recall
that we can rewrite R̂ as R̂ = Γ + C + s, where Γ is a positive term. If α + s ≥ 1,
Γ + C + s ≥ Γ + C + 1− α > C + 1− α. Thus, R∗ = C + 1− α from equation (3.3).
When α + s > 1, the cost ranges of an incumbent and the entrants do not overlap.
Under EPC, the optimal R∗ = C + 1− α, while the winning supplier at T = 1 will always
win at T = 2 under SI with the reserve price r2 = C + 1− α. Hence, the two mechanisms
8ETCSI (if α + s < 1) in equation (3.6) mirrors Grimm(2003)’s findings. She denotes Φ1 as the “value
of competition” and Φ2 as the “looser’s option value”.
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Table 3.2: Conditions for comparisons of the buyer’s expected total costs under EPC and
SI
R∗ = C + 1− α R∗ = C + 1− α R∗ = R̂
N small, N large,
α, s large (α + s ≥ 1) α, s large(α + s < 1) α, s small (α + s < 1)
ETCEPC < ETCSI ETCEPC < ETCSI
ETCEPC = ETCSI (⇐⇒ 0 > Φ1− Φ2) (⇐⇒ Ψ > Φ1− Φ2)
ETCEPC > ETCSI ETCEPC > ETCSI
(⇐⇒ 0 < Φ1− Φ2) (⇐⇒ Ψ < Φ1− Φ2)
are cost equivalent. However, when the bidders’ costs overlap (i.e., α + s < 1), either EPC
or SI can minimize the buyer’s expected total cost. Propositions 3.6 and 3.7 and table 3.2
present the conditions under which each mechanism dominates, while table 3.3 presents
Table 3.3: Numerical Examples of table 3 : except the case of α + s ≥ 1 (Uniform)
R∗ = C + 1− α R∗ = R̂




(N, α, s) Φ1 Φ2 R∗ (N, α, s) Φ1 Φ2 Ψ R∗
(3, 0.4, 0.3) -0.1 (8, 0.4, 0.3) 0.2
0.0007 0.0038 1.6 0.0078 0.0019 0.0005 1.57
(6, 0.4, 0.3) 0.1 (20, 0.4, 0.3) 0.1
0.0047 0.0024 1.6 0.0221 0.0005 0.0195 1.40
(3, 0.1, 0.1) -0.6 (3, 0.03, 0.1) -0.5
0.0341 0.0512 1.9 0.0477 0.0620 0.0007 1.93
(3, 0.4, 0.1) -0.4 (3, 0.05, 0.1) -0.5
0.0052 0.0156 1.6 0.0435 0.0589 0.0001 1.93
(4, 0.3, 0.2) 0.0 (4, 0.3, 0.05) 0.3
0.0125 0.0120 1.7 0.0330 0.0218 0.0022 1.63
(4, 0.3, 0.4) -0.1 (4, 0.3, 0.1) 0.2
0.0018 0.0033 1.7 0.0246 0.0183 0.0001 1.68
23
representative numerical instances that support each scenario.
PROPOSITION 3.6. When R∗ = C +1−α and α+s < 1, the buyer’s expected total cost
under EPC is less than that under SI when Φ1 < Φ2 is satisfied. Conversely, SI outperforms
EPC when Φ1 > Φ2 is satisfied.
PROPOSITION 3.7. When R∗ = R̂, the buyer’s expected total cost under EPC is less
than that under SI when Ψ > Φ1− Φ2 is satisfied. Conversely, SI outperforms EPC when
Ψ < Φ1− Φ2 is satisfied.
The buyer will generally find it optimal to set R∗ = C + 1 − α when the entrant pool
is uncompetitive, i.e., N is small and/or when α or s are large. Whether or not SI will
outperform EPC then depends on which factor exerts the larger force; the expected cost
savings from holding an auction at T = 2 with N bidders (Φ1) versus the degree to which
bidders inflate their bid at T = 1 due to the presence of the second auction(Φ2). As the
entrant pool becomes more competitive (N increases and/or α or s decrease), the buyer
will find it optimal to set R∗ = R̂ < C +1−α and expose herself to the incumbent rejecting
the contract at T = 2 and running a second auction with an associated cost savings of Ψ.
Whether or not EPC dominates SI will depend on the value of having an addition bidder
and having the price be competitively determined at T = 2.
While the derivation of the equilibrium bids and optimal R∗ proved to be an interesting
theoretical exercise, we found that the actual cost difference between EPC and SI was very
small in various distributions, e.g. when F follows beta distributions with different beta
functions (e.g. B(1, 1) - uniform, B(2, 3), B(2, 2), B(3, 2)). From our numerical examples,
as a general rule, we found that SI will dominate EPC if R∗ = R̂ < C + 1 − α; the only
exception to the rule occurred when N = 3 (see table 3.4, 3.5, 3.6, and 3.7).
OBSERVATION 3.3. The expected cost difference between EPC and SI is less than 1%.
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Table 3.4: Comparison of EPC and SI under NLI : Beta B(1, 1) - Uniform
s = 0.1
α  N 3 4 5 6 10 20
0.1 -0.6 (tH) 0.5 (R̂) 0.6 (R̂) 0.5 (R̂) 0.3 (R̂) 0.1 (R̂)
0.2 -0.6 (tH) 0.4 (R̂) 0.6 (R̂) 0.5 (R̂) 0.3 (R̂) 0.1 (R̂)
0.3 -0.5 (tH) 0.2 (R̂) 0.5 (R̂) 0.5 (R̂) 0.3 (R̂) 0.1 (R̂)
0.4 -0.4 (tH) 0.0 (tH) 0.4 (R̂) 0.5 (R̂) 0.3 (R̂) 0.1 (R̂)
0.5 -0.3 (tH) -0.1 (tH) 0.1 (tH) 0.3 (R̂) 0.3 (R̂) 0.1 (R̂)
0.7 0.0 (tH) 0.0 (tH) 0.0 (tH) 0.0 (tH) 0.1 (tH) 0.1 (R̂)
α = 0.4
s  N 3 4 5 6 10 20
0.1 -0.4 (tH) 0.0 (tH) 0.4 (R̂) 0.5 (R̂) 0.3 (R̂) 0.1 (R̂)
0.2 -0.2 (tH) -0.1 (tH) 0.1 (tH) 0.3 (R̂) 0.3 (R̂) 0.1 (R̂)
0.3 -0.1 (tH) -0.1 (tH) 0.0 (tH) 0.1 (tH) 0.2 (R̂) 0.1 (R̂)
0.4 -0.0 (tH) -0.0 (tH) -0.0 (tH) 0.0 (tH) 0.1 (tH) 0.1 (R̂)
0.5 -0.0 (tH) -0.0 (tH) 0.0 (tH) 0.0 (tH) 0.0 (tH) 0.0 (tH)
0.7 0.0 (tH) 0.0 (tH) 0.0 (tH) 0.0 (tH) 0.0 (tH) 0.0 (tH)






; the negative terms imply ETCEPC < ETCSI .
>> The optimal R∗ is shown in the parenthesis (where tH ≡ C + 1− α).
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Table 3.5: Comparison of EPC and SI under NLI : Beta B(2, 2)
s = 0.1 α = 0.4
α  N 3 4 5 6 10 20 s  N 3 4 5 6 10 20
0.1 -0.5 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.1 -0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.1
0.2 -0.4 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1
0.3 -0.3 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1
0.4 -0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.5 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0






; the negative terms imply ETCEPC < ETCSI .
Table 3.6: Comparison of EPC and SI under NLI : Beta B(2, 3)
s = 0.1 α = 0.4
α  N 3 4 5 6 10 20 s  N 3 4 5 6 10 20
0.1 -0.3 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1
0.2 -0.3 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.3 -0.2 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.4 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0






; the negative terms imply ETCEPC < ETCSI .
Table 3.7: Comparison of EPC and SI under NLI : Beta B(3, 2)
s = 0.1 α = 0.4
α  N 3 4 5 6 10 20 s  N 3 4 5 6 10 20
0.1 -0.5 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1
0.2 -0.4 -0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.3 -0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.4 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0






; the negative terms imply ETCEPC < ETCSI .
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CHAPTER IV
PROCUREMENT MECHANISMS UNDER LOCK-IN
SETTING 1 (LI1)
4.1 Model
In previous chapter (NLI), we study the procurement mechanisms where all suppliers redraw
their cost at T = 2 from the same distribution ∼ [C − α, C + 1− α], if they wins at T = 1.
By this common cost distribution for any type of an incumbent, (1) all supplier types
shade/infalte their bids by same amount, and (2) the buyer is indifferent from the type of
the winner at T = 1, and hence she announces a single value R as a eroding price at T = 2
under EPC.
Different from NLI, in some market settings, an incumbent’s cost at T = 2 depends on
his cost at T = 1. For example, the incumbent supplier may be able to write a long-term
contract fixing his own input prices over both periods. Under such settings, the incumbent’s
cost at T = 2 is drawn from the range of values [t1 − α, t1].
Since the cost distribution of an incumbent depends on his type at T = 1, the dynamics
of the bidder’s behaviors as well as the choice of the optimal R(t1) under a LI1 setting
become more complex when compared to those under NLI. For example, when the bidder
submits his bid at T = 1, he must consider the winning opponent’s cost T = 1 should he
lose and its impact on his potential profits at T = 2. The same is not true under NLI.
Similarly, the buyer’s selection of the optimal eroding price contract is complicated by
the incumbent’s temporal cost dependency; it is no longer optimal to offer all supplier types
the same price at T = 2. Rather, the buyer should offer a schedule of R values, R(t1), one
for each type of supplier at T = 1. (Note: The buyer is able to infer a supplier’s type by his
bid at T = 1 under strictly monotonically increasing bid functions. Hence, we can model
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Figure 4.1: Costs at T = 1 and T = 2 under LI1
R(t1)). In our discussions with companies that have employed EPC1, we learned that
non-discriminatory eroding price contracts are the most commonly used format, i.e., any
winning supplier is required to reduce its price in the second period by the same fixed
percent (1 − k) and is paid the price R(t1) = kt1 where 0 < k ≤ 1. Markets for which
non-discriminatory eroding price contracts have been used in FreeMarkets auctions include
PCA/PCBs, capacitors, transceivers, monitors, and wire harnesses, please see table1.1 in
chapter 1 for additional examples.
We summarize LI1 model settings described above as follows (the basic scheme of the
model is described in chapter 2).
• Suppliers’ costs at T = 2 : The supplier who wins the auction at T = 1 ‘locks-in’ his
(baseline) cost for the future; all other suppliers redraw their costs at T = 2.
1During the summer of 2003, Se-kyoung Oh had the benefit of interning at FreeMarkets.com, where she
was able to observe their auction practices across multiple markets. We wish to extend our thanks to Jack
Allamon, Bill Blair, Michael Bryson, Brenna Bulwinkle, and David Talbot for sharing with us their time
and auction experiences.
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• Incumbent’s cost t2I distribution : the incumbent’s cost at T = 2 is drawn from the
distrtibution FI(t2I) : F (t
1 − α) = 0, F (t1) = 1 .
• Possible value of R(t1) : R(t1) ∈ [t1 − α, t1] ∀ t. That is that the buyer does not
consider price schedules that are guaranteed to make the supplier unprofitable at
T = 2 (R(t1) < t1−α) or pay the supplier more than his first period cost (R(t1) > t1).2
• Setting of future price : R(t1) and reserve price under SI are based on the supplier’s
bid at T = 1. That is, the payment to the incumbent will be influenced by the
supplier’s bid at T = 1.
Figure 4.1 shows the cost distributions of suppliers in each period (refer figure 3.1 for
comparison of NLI and LI1).
4.2 Equilibrium Bidding Strategy and the Optimal Eroding
Price R(t1) under EPC
We first solve for the equilibrium bidding strategies under EPC.
PROPOSITION 4.1. In combination with the second period bids outlined in equation
(2.1), the following constitutes a subgame perfect equilibrium bidding strategy under EPC,
B1EPC(t




























, ∀ t1 (4.1)
Proof. see appendix C.1
In contrast with B1EPC(t
1) under NLI (equation (3.1)), suppliers may inflate or shade
their bids at T = 1 differentially (i.e., not by the same amount). In equilibrium, supplier t
submits a bid that reflects his unit cost at T = 1(t1), shaded by his expected profit at T = 2
as an incumbent (E[Π2EPC(t
2
I);R(t
1)]). However, this downward pressure on a supplier’s
2Thus, we will only consider max{1− α
t1
: t ∈ [C, C + 1]} ≤ k ≤ 1.
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bid is countered by (1) the likelihood that he is the lowest cost supplier in the auction at
T = 1 ( 1−F (t
1)
(N−1)f(t1)), and the attractiveness of misrepresenting his type at T = 1 in order to
affect his payment at T = 2 (R′(t1) = ∂R(t
1)
∂t1
), and (2) the possibility of earning money in




The eroding price contract influences a supplier’s bid in two ways. The absolute value
of R(t1) directly affects a supplier’s expected profitability at T = 2. The higher a supplier’s
expected profit at T = 2, the more aggressively he will bid at T = 1. Conversely, if R(t1)
is set so low as to make profitable production at T = 2 very unlikely, then a supplier will
compensate for this future negative profit stream by inflating his bid at T = 1 proportion-
ately. The shape of R(t1) affects how competitively a supplier bids at T = 1 with respect
to his competitors. As R′(t1) increases, supplier t has a greater incentive to bid as a higher
type and hence secure a higher payment at T = 2, if he should win at T = 1.
As we saw in proposition 3.1 in section 3.2 , the ability of the incumbent supplier to
reject R(t1) at T = 2 exerts both bid shading and bid inflating forces on his bid at T = 13.
Given the increased complexity of the buyer’s decision problem, i.e., determining an
entire schedule of prices as opposed to a single price, we now limit our focus to a setting
where when F follows the uniform distribution. While this assumption was not needed to
derive the equilibrium bidding strategies, it was necessary in order to derive the optimal
eroding price contract (we were unable to solve the buyer’s decision problem under the
general distribution).4
PROPOSITION 4.2. Under the non-discriminatory eroding price schedule R(t1) = kt1,
the buyer’s expected total cost under EPC is minimized when k = 1. The buyer’s expected
total cost is as follows.
ETCEPC(R∗(t1)) = E[t1(2:N)] + E[t
2
I(2:N)] (4.2)
3A bidder t’s expected profit as an entrant is considered only if an incumbent w( 6= t) rejects the buyer’s
offer R(w1) at T = 2. This is captured in 1 − FI(R(t1)) in the last term in equation (4.1). At T = 1, the
incumbent’s cost w1 should be no greater than t1 to be the winner (w1 ∼ [C, t1], and hence 1 − FI(R(t1))
is the probability that the incumbent with the marginal cost, t1 rejects R(t1).
4To get an idea of the robustness of our result, we used numerical methods to solve for the optimal
k under different beta distributions (e.g. beta functions B(2, 3), B(2, 2), B(3, 2)). We found that in all








































Figure 4.2: Equilibrium bidding strategies in non-discriminatory EPC, with N = 6, α =
0.4 and s = 0.1
Proof. see appendix C.2 and C.4.
One might initially think that the buyer would find it optimal to set k < 1, due to the
possibility of a high type supplier winning at T = 1. With k < 1, the buyer could then
hopefully procure from a lower cost supplier in the auction at T = 2 if the incumbent does
not experience a sufficient cost reduction. However, a non-discriminatory R(t1) does not
offer the buyer the opportunity to differentially set k for each t1. That, in combination
with the fact that suppliers’ bids at T = 1 become more aggressive as k increases and the
incumbent’s cost at T = 2 is bounded from above by t1 (which was not the case under NLI)
implies that it is optimal for the buyer to guarantee a non-negative profit stream to any
incumbent supplier at T = 2, and hence keep her incumbent supplier with probability equal
to one.
It is illuminating to observe the shifts in BktEPC(t) as k increases. Figure 4.2 illustrates
that suppliers bid more aggressively as k increases: This reflects the increase in expected
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profit at T = 2 if the supplier should win at T = 1. For example, under k = 0.8, the
supplier with cost t = 1.5 rejects R(t) with a probability of 75%; he takes this into account
when submitting his bid at T = 1 and inflates his bid above cost (2.2% inflation) to reflect
the opportunity cost of winning at T = 1 and not being able to participate in an auction
at T = 2 with a new and potentially lower cost. As k increases, the probability that the
incumbent rejects the contract decreases significantly (Pr(reject) = 37.5% for k = 0.9, is
equal to 0 for k = 1). When k = 1, supplier t = 1.5 shades his bid below his cost by 6.7%.
Again, the differential bid shading reflects the suppliers’ relative competitiveness, as well as
their expected profits at T = 2, should they win at T = 1.
The rate of decrease in bids in combination with the reduced likelihood of incurring s
dominates the rate of the increase in R(t1) (the buyer’s expected total cost is decreasing
convex function of k - appendix C.2), and hence k = 1 minimizes the buyer’s total expected
costs5.
4.3 Equilibrium Bidding Strategy under SI and Compar-
isons between EPC and SI
While we were able to derive a closed form solution for the bids under EPC, we were unable
to do so under SI 6.
Table 4.1: Parameters used for B1SI(t)
C 1 , t ∼ U [1, 2]
N 3, 4, 5, . . ., 10, 20, 30
α 0.05, 0.1, 0.2, . . ., 0.9
s 0.05, 0.1, 0.2, . . ., 0.9
5In appendix C.3, we show the sensitivity of the choice of R∗(t1) = kt1. The buyer’s cost are more
sensitive to a chance of k (i.e., his cost would rapidly increase), as α and N decrease and s increases.
6The bid monotonicity assumption was violated under a few market settings; this implies that strictly
monotonically increasing bids may fail to exist for SI when F is continuous. Our next step was to assume
a discrete distribution for the supplier type space, and use numerical methods to solve for the equilibrium
bids. Under this altered setting, we were able to find equilibrium bids that satisfy strict monotonicity. For
each supplier type, we iteratively search for the optimal bid which maximizes his profit given other suppliers’
bids, Πi(B1, ..., Bi−1, Bi+1, ..., Bn) (see appendix D for the payoff function of bidder t). MATLAB was used
for this experiments (interested readers may contact the authors for a copy of the algorithm)
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We ran our algorithm over the experimental settings in table 4.1 and varied the values of
α, s, and N to capture a wide spectrum of market settings (based on this, we obtained the
buyer’s expected total cost under SI and compared it with the buyer’s cost under EPC. We
ran a total of 1210 market instances.)7. We approximate the uniform distribution of supplier
types by discretizing the uniform distribution over the interval [C,C+1] by increments of 1n ,
i.e., (t1, t2, . . . , tn) = (C, C + 1n . . . , C +
n−1
n ). Under these market settings, we first discuss
the equilibrium bidding behavior under SI and proceed to compare the buyer’s expected
total cost under SI and EPC.
Figure 4.3 plots the equilibrium bids under SI and EPC in four different market settings.
As we can see, the bids under SI and EPC are similar for low supplier types, while the
difference become larger for high types.
Under EPC, the supplier who wins at T = 1 will always supply the buyer at T = 2 (and
there will be no second auction if he should lose at T = 1 and hence there is no opportunity
cost associated with winning at T = 1). As a result, the bidder submits an aggressive bid
to win at T = 1; for example, the highest type (= C + 1) shades his bid by amount of his
expected profit at T = 2, E[Π2EPC(t
2
I)]. Under SI, the supplier who wins at T = 1 must
compete again for the buyer’s business at T = 2. For a high type, his cost at T = 2 (after
experiencing a cost reduction) may not be competitive vis-a-vis the entrants’ costs, leaving
open the possibility of losing at T = 2. Conversely, should he lose at T = 1, he can reenter
the auction at T = 2 with a new and potentially more competitive cost, hence his bid at
T = 1 is conservative. For lower types, it is more likely that a supplier who wins at T = 1
will also win in the auction at T = 2, and his bid at T = 1 reflects this in the form of greater
bid shading. For a very low type, they will win again at T = 2 with almost certainty and
be paid the reserve price (equal to his cost t1), as would be the case under EPC.
Given the equilibrium bidding strategies, we next compare the buyer’s expected total
cost under EPC and SI.
OBSERVATION 4.1. The performance of EPC when compared to SI improves as we














































































Figure 4.3: Bids under EPC and SI in various markets
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Table 4.2: Comparison of non-discrim. EPC (k = 1) and SI under LI1
s = 0.1 α = 0.1
α  N 3 4 5 6 10 20 s  N 3 4 5 6 10 20
0.1 2.8 3.4 3.3 3.1 1.7 0.1 0.1 2.8 3.4 3.3 3.1 1.7 0.1
0.2 2.5 2.9 2.8 2.1 0.6 -0.4 0.2 2.3 2.6 2.4 2.2 1.3 -0.1
0.3 2.3 2.3 1.7 1.2 0.0 -0.5 0.3 1.9 2.0 1.8 1.5 1.1 -0.1
0.4 1.9 1.5 1.1 0.6 -0.1 -0.6 0.4 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.2 1.1 -0.1
0.5 1.3 1.0 0.5 0.2 -0.3 -0.8 0.5 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.1 1.1 -0.1
0.7 0.5 0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.6 -1.1 0.7 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.1 -0.1
s = 0.4 α = 0.4
α  N 3 4 5 6 10 20 s  N 3 4 5 6 10 20
0.1 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.2 1.1 -0.1 0.1 1.9 1.5 1.1 0.6 -0.1 -0.6
0.2 1.5 1.3 1.0 0.9 -0.1 -0.5 0.2 1.4 1.1 0.5 0.0 -0.4 -0.6
0.3 1.1 0.8 0.6 0.2 -0.5 -0.5 0.3 1.0 0.7 0.1 -0.3 -0.5 -0.6
0.4 0.8 0.5 0.0 -0.4 -0.6 -0.6 0.4 0.8 0.5 0.0 -0.4 -0.6 -0.6
0.5 0.4 0.0 -0.4 -0.5 -0.7 -0.8 0.5 0.6 0.4 -0.1 -0.4 -0.6 -0.6
0.7 -0.2 -0.5 -0.6 -0.7 -0.9 -1.1 0.7 0.6 0.3 -0.1 -0.5 -0.6 -0.6






; the negative terms imply ETCEPC < ETCSI .
increase s, α or N . The buyer’s expected total cost under EPC is less than or (at least)
same as that under SI when at least two of the market parameters (N , α, and s) are
large. Conversely, her cost under SI is less than that under EPC when at least two of the
parameters are small.
Table 4.2 illustrates this observation as we vary N , α, and s. Note that the effect of an
increase in α is more significant than that of s. For example, when N = 6, α = 0.1 and
s = 0.1, the difference is 3.1% (SI outperforms EPC). If s increases to 0.4, it decreases to
1.2%. However, if α increases to 0.4, the difference is further reduced to 0.6%.
As α increases, the incumbent become more competitive at T = 2. Under EPC, the
incumbent fully reflects this advantage to his bid at T = 1, i.e., his bid at T = 1 becomes
more aggressive by the exact amount of the increased cost reduction at T = 2. That is,
35
the fact that the buyer will always keep her incumbent at T = 2 (R∗(t1) = t1) extracts the
most aggressive bid from the bidder (e.g., with other settings fixed, if α increases from 0.1
to 0.3, bidder t’s bid at T = 1 decreases by 0.1 (= 0.15− 0.05), which is the increase of the
expected cost reduction). However, it is not the case under SI. Under SI, the incumbent
would lose at T = 2 with a positive probability. Thus, the increase of α is not fully captured
to the bid at T = 1. Combined with the fact that the buyer’s cost at T = 2 under SI also
does not fully capture the increase of cost reduction, the rate of the buyer’s cost decrease
at T = 1 under EPC offsets the rate of the decrease at T = 2 under SI, hence EPC becomes
more attractive to the buyer as α increases.
The change of the switching cost s does not affect both the buyer’s expected total cost
and the bids under EPC (see equation (4.2) in proposition 4.2). Under SI, the buyer’s
costs at T = 1 and 2 increase when s increases by some degree, and hence EPC becomes
attractive to the buyer. Note that with large s, the incumbent would always be the winner
and paid the reserve price at T = 2, which implies that the cost at T = 2 would not change
under SI. Therefore, after some degree of s increases, the difference between EPC and SI
would remain same.
The change of supplier’s cost structures (or buyer’s cost), i.e., change of α and s, il-
lustrate that EPC becomes attractive to the buyer as the incumbent becomes competitive.
However, the change of N has different effect on the comparisons between the buyer’s total
costs under EPC and SI.
As we see in table 4.2, with larger N , i.e., entrants become competitive at T = 2, EPC
becomes attractive to the buyer. When N increases, the cost difference at T = 2 between
the incumbent and the lowest entrant decreases, which affects the supplier’s expected profit
at T = 1 under SI, while it does not under EPC.
As opposed to the NLI setting, the cost differences can be significant under LI1, ranging
anywhere from −1.3% to 5%. This implies that it would be worthwhile for the buyer to
educate herself about her supplier pools’ cost characteristics (i.e., s and α) as well as the
size of the potential bidder pool N before determining whether or not to offer a longer-term
relationship to the winner in the first auction. It is worth reiterating that under the optimal
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EPC, the buyer does not actually ask to share in any of the cost reductions at T = 2 (k = 1);
therefore the superior performance under EPC is arising from the long-term stability of the
relationship.
4.4 Extensions and Managerial Insights
4.4.1 Discriminatory R(t1) under LI1
Under the NLI setting, the potentially complicated eroding price schedule R(t1) reduces its
form to a simple R due to the independence of the incumbent’s cost over time. However,
under the LI setting, the buyer should set a different price for each supplier type t1. In
practice, the buyers simplify a potentially complex price schedule by offering mainly nondis-
criminatory contracts where all suppliers are asked for the same fractional price reduction,
R(t1) = kt1. While using non-discriminatory price schedule may simplify the buyer’s prob-
lem, it may also leave some ‘money on the table’ for the suppliers. If the buyer were to
offer a discriminatory price schedule, R(t1) = κ(t1)t1, it is clear that the buyer would be
better off (or at least no worse off). What is not clear is how much better off would she be,
what would be the form of the optimal contract and if the cost savings would warranty the
added complexity of the contract design.
We assume that R(t1) is differentiable everywhere and is strictly monotonically increas-
ing in t1. Thus a buyer would never require a lower price from a higher type t1; this
assumption is particularly reasonable since the suppliers are assumed to have no control on
their cost reduction, i.e., the cost reduction arises merely out of having supplied the buyer
once before and is not a direct result of any cost-saving measures. By solving a nonlinear
program, we were able to find the buyer’s optimal R(t1) (or κ(t1)) for a bidder t.
OBSERVATION 4.2. Under the LI1 setting, the buyer finds in optimal to offer a contract
R(t1) = κ(t1)t1 that has the following properties: (1) guarantee for both ‘low’ and ‘high’
cost suppliers that they will not be unprofitable at T = 2 (i.e., κ(t1) ≈ 1) and (2) extract
some potential cost reductions for ‘moderate’ cost suppliers(i.e., κ(t1) < 1).
The buyer finds it optimal to set κ(t1) = 1 for high cost types, thereby eliciting the most















1.0,4.0,6 === sN α
1.0,4.0,20 === sN α
3.0,4.0,6 === sN α
1.0,05.0,6 === sN α
Figure 4.4: Optimal discriminatory R(t1) for different market settings (N,α, s) under LI1
‘high’ cost supplier winning at T = 1 being low, renders κ(t1) = 1 optimal. The aggressive
bidding behavior from this ‘high’ cost group cascades down and exerts a downward pressure
on ‘low’ cost suppliers’ bids. The reason for κ(t1) = 1 for low cost suppliers is the incumbent
supplier’s ability to reject R(t1) at T = 2. Since (i) a low cost supplier will reject any
unprofitable contract, and (ii) the probability that the expected payment at T = 2 from
the auction plus switching cost is less than the incumbent’s unit cost is low (the incumbent’s
cost at T = 1 is the lowest order statistic of N random draws, while the winner at T = 2
would be the lowest order statistic of N − 1 random draws), the buyer finds it optimal to
set κ(t1) = 1 for low cost suppliers. For the ‘moderate’ cost suppliers, the buyer finds it
optimal to set κ(t1) < 1, in the hopes of securing a lower price at T = 2 if the incumbent
supplier should win and accept R(t1) and, if not, of securing a price from the second auction
that is comparable to R(t). The degree of κ(t1) < 1 and the range of the types differ by
the market settings (N, α, s) (see figure 4.4)8.
8As we see in figure 4.4, The definition of the ‘moderate’ group changes across markets; this group shifts
down (towards C) as N increases (N increases from 6 to 20), and shifts up (towards C + 1) as s increases
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Table 4.3: Comparison of discrim. EPC and SI under LI1
s = 0.1 α = 0.1
α  N 3 4 5 6 10 20 s  N 3 4 5 6 10 20
0.1 2.8 2.7 2.4 2.0 0.7 -0.3 0.1 1.9 1.1 0.4 -0.1 -0.6 -0.8
0.2 2.5 2.1 1.9 0.9 -0.1 -0.7 0.2 1.4 0.9 0.2 -0.4 -0.7 -0.8
0.3 2.3 1.6 0.9 0.4 -0.6 -0.7 0.3 1.0 0.6 0.0 -0.5 -0.7 -0.7
0.4 1.9 1.1 0.4 -0.1 -0.6 -0.8 0.4 0.8 0.5 -0.1 -0.5 -0.6 -0.7
0.5 1.3 0.7 0.0 -0.4 -0.7 -1.1 0.5 0.6 0.4 -0.2 -0.5 -0.6 -0.7
0.7 0.5 -0.1 -0.5 -0.6 -1.0 -1.3 0.7 0.6 0.3 -0.1 -0.5 -0.6 -0.6






; the negative terms imply ETCEPC < ETCSI .
This flexibility of the price schedule at T = 2 makes the buyer better off compare to the
nondiscriminatory schedule. For example, when N = 6 α = 0.4, s = 0.1, SI outperforms
EPC with the nondiscriminatory price schedule R(t1) = kt1(the difference between the
buyer’s expected total cost under EPC and SI is 0.6%) but EPC outperforms SI with the
discriminatory schedule R(t1) = κ(t1)t1 (the difference is -0.1%) (see table 4.3).
4.4.2 α under LI
Cost savings arising from learning by doing, economies of scale in production or other
manifestations of synergies can occur in many forms. In section 4.1 we assumed that an
incumbent’s cost at T = 2 was drawn from the interval [t1−α, t1], i.e., all suppliers faced the
same absolute potential reduction in costs. An alternative cost framework is one where high
cost suppliers have more potential for cost reduction (e.g., more ‘low-hanging fruit’). We
next consider the case where the maximum cost reduction is proportional to the supplier’s
type t1, and as such, the cost range of an incumbent supplier is [(1− α)t1, t1], where α is
the same for all suppliers.
(s increases from 0.1 to 0.3). For small s, R(t1) → t1 − α for ‘moderate’ types when α is small, while
R(t1) >> t1−α when α is large. When α is small (e.g., α = 0.05), the incumbent does not have a large cost
advantage over entrants at T = 2; hence the buyer finds it optimal to set R(t1) = t1 − α for the moderate
type suppliers in order to secure a price comparable to the cost of the lowest cost entrant at T = 2. When
s is large (s > 0.5), the buyer wants to keep the incumbent for any α, and sets the optimal R(t1) = t1 ∀t1,
i.e., the set of ‘moderate’ suppliers is the null set.
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Table 4.4: Comparison of non-discrim. EPC and SI with proportional α under LI1
s = 0.1 α = 0.1
α  N 3 4 5 6 10 20 s  N 3 4 5 6 10 20
0.1 2.6 3.1 3.1 2.9 1.5 0.0 0.1 0.9 0.7 0.4 0.0 -0.6 -0.7
0.2 2.1 2.4 2.0 1.5 0.3 -0.5 0.2 0.6 0.3 -0.1 -0.4 -0.7 -0.8
0.3 1.5 1.3 1.0 0.7 -0.2 -0.6 0.3 0.4 0.0 -0.3 -0.6 -0.7 -0.8
0.4 0.9 0.7 0.4 0.0 -0.6 -0.7 0.4 0.3 -0.1 -0.4 -0.6 -0.7 -0.8
0.5 0.5 0.2 -0.3 -0.4 -0.7 -0.8 0.5 0.0 -0.2 -0.4 -0.6 -0.6 -0.8
0.7 -0.5 -0.8 -0.7 -0.8 -1.1 -1.1 0.7 -0.1 -0.1 -0.4 -0.6 -0.7 -0.8






; the negative terms imply ETCEPC < ETCSI .
>> the optimal R∗(t1) = t1 in above examples
Under the same market setting as in table 4.1, we found that (1) it is still optimal for












BSI(t) : same α
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t - α t
t - α




Figure 4.5: Bids under SI and EPC when the maximum possible cost reduction α is (1)
same for all types and (2) proportional to the type (N = 6, α = 0.4, s = 0.1)
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observation 4.1 continues to hold (see table 4.4). Note that the performance of EPC is
improved under this proportional cost reduction setting. Since high cost types face a larger
potential decrease in cost at T = 2, this larger cost reduction coupled with the optimal
schedule R(t1) = t1, implies that they bid more aggressively at T = 1 and this aggression
cascades down to lower types, while under SI, the larger cost reduction for higher types
can not be fully captured in bid at T = 1 due to the positive probability of not winning at
T = 2. And hence, EPC’s performance improves when the cost reduction is proportional
to the bidder’s type.
4.4.3 Cost distribution shift at T = 2
Another extension on our original model that we consider is a shift in the cost distribution
at T = 2. In previous sections, we assumed that the distribution of costs for entrants
at T = 2 stays same as in T = 1, i.e., [C, C + 1], and only the incumbent redraws his
cost from a new (lower) cost range. This is a valid assumption when industry costs are
relatively stable over time, and/or there is only a single buyer in the market. However,
the suppliers may be operating in a market where the cost of raw materials or technology
increases or decreases over time. Alternatively, suppliers may be able to supply multiple
buyers simultaneously and experience learning by doing through the production process
for other buyers; however, the incumbent may still have an comparative cost advantage
over the entrants due to buyer-specific learning-by-doing (e.g., leather seat example in the
introduction). Both of these market effects can be modeled as a shift in the entrant’s cost
range at T = 2, i.e., [C + ξ, C + 1 + ξ] (ξ > (<)0).9
Under LI1 setting, the incumbent’s cost at T = 2 would continue to be drawn from
[t1−α, t1], while the entrants’ costs are drawn from [C +ξ, C +1+ξ]. Recall that the buyer
uses effective bid rather than submitted bid for selecting the winning supplier at T = 2, due
to the presence of the switching cost s; the shift in the entrants’ cost distribution ξ plays a
9Under the NLI setting, the incumbent does not lock in his previous cost at T = 2 and, like entrants,
must redraw his ‘baseline cost’ at T = 2. If the industry experiences a shift in costs, it effects both the
incumbent and the entrants, and their cost distributions at T = 2 become [C − α + ξ, C + 1 − α + ξ] and
[C + ξ, C +1+ ξ], respectively. Since both the incumbent’s and the entrants’ costs shifts upward/downward
by ξ, these shifts canceled out each other and hence our analysis and results in section 3.3 carry over.
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Table 4.5: Comparisons of EPC and SI with entrant’s cost shifts under LI1
ξ = −0.5 ξ = 0 ξ = 0.5
N α s ∆ETC k ∆ETC k ∆ETC k
3 0.3 0.3 5.5 1.00 1.5 1.00 0.8 1.00
6 0.1 0.4 3.4 0.96 1.2 1.00 1.1 1.00
6 0.4 0.1 3.6 0.80 0.6 1.00 -0.4 1.00
10 0.2 0.3 3.1 0.90 -0.1 1.00 -0.2 1.00
10 0.3 0.2 3.0 0.85 -0.3 1.00 -0.5 1.00
20 0.1 0.5 1.0 1.00 -0.1 1.00 -0.1 1.00
20 0.5 0.1 1.7 0.76 -0.8 1.00 -0.8 1.00






; the negative terms imply ETCEPC < ETCSI .
>> R∗(t1) = kt1
>>> ξ = −0.5 : cost shifts downward, ξ = 0.5 : cost shifts upward.
similar role and offers us some intuition as to the robustness of our results.
When the entrants’ cost distribution shifts upward (i.e., ξ > 0), it is the same as an
increase in s. The buyer would still find it optimal to set k = 1 and offer the contract
R(t1) = t1, for now the incumbent is even more attractive to the buyer when compared
to the case of ξ = 0. Similarly, when ξ > 0, EPC becomes more attractive than SI to the
buyer . When the entrants’ cost distribution shifts downward (i.e.,ξ < 0), R(t1) = t1 may
no longer be optimal. For example, when N = 6, α = 0.4, s = 0.1, the % cost difference
of between EPC and SI is 0.6% when ξ = 0. It decreases to -0.4% when ξ = 0.5 (cost shift




PROCUREMENT MECHANISMS UNDER LOCK-IN
SETTING 2 (LI2)
5.1 Model
In the previous chapter 4 (LI1), the buyer makes her future payment based on the supplier’s
bid at T = 1. Under this setting, supplier t knows that the buyer sets the reserve price
based on his bid (i.e., his reported cost type) at T = 1 if he wins at T = 1. Thus, the
supplier takes into account his future payment as well as his winning chance at T = 1 when
he reports his type at T = 1 with trying to capture some information rent. For example, if
the supplier t reports his type as τ(> t1) and wins the auction at T = 1, the reserve price
is set to be τ under SI and the eroding price R(τ) under EPC.
However, in some market, buyers is able to audit their suppliers and make any future
payments based on the supplier’s actual observed costs, not his bid at T = 1. Under this
setting, the supplier’s true type t1 (even if he reported his type as τ at T = 1) will be
revealed to the buyer, and hence the reserve price is set to be t1 under SI and the eroding
price R(t1) under EPC.
Note that under both cases, the resulting reserve price r2 in equilibrium is t1 (i.e., the
difference between LI1 and LI2 is the bidder’s strategic behaviors at T = 1).1
In this chapter, we study LI2 in which the buyer audits the supplier’s cost after the
production (we compare LI1 and LI2 in chapter 5.5). All settings are the same as in LI1
1The difference becomes clearer if we compare supplier t’s payoff when he wins at T = 1 and 2 and is
paid by the reserve price r2 (when C + s ≥ t < C + 1− α). Under LI1 and LI2, payoffs are as follows.







[B(w) + τ − t− t2I ] f(1:N−1)(w)f(1:N−1)(w2E)fI(t2I) dw dw2E dt2I







[B(w) + t− t− t2I ] f(1:N−1)(w)f(1:N−1)(w2E)fI(t2I) dw dw2E dt2I
See appendix D and F for the supplier’s entire payoff function.
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(see section 4.1), except the followings2 :
• Under EPC, R(t1) is based on the supplier’s actual cost at T = 1, and hence bidder
t’s bid at T = 1 can not affect R(t1) at T = 2.
• Under SI, reserve price r2 is set to be t1, the incumbent’s cost at T = 1.
Similar to LI1, we solve for the equilibrium bidding strategies and the buyer’s expected
total costs under EPC and SI and proceed to compare these two mechanisms. Also notice
that we are focusing on the uniform distribution3.
5.2 Equilibrium Bidding Strategy and the Optimal Eroding
Price R(t1) under EPC
We first start to solve for the equilibrium bidding strategy at T = 1 under EPC4.
PROPOSITION 5.1. In combination with the second period bids outlined in equation
(2.1), the following constitutes a subgame perfect symmetric equilibrium bidding strategy
under EPC,
B1EPC(t
























Proof. see appendix E.1




1)] (i.e., the incumbent supplier never experiences a negative
profit at T = 2 because he has a right to reject R(t1) if R(t1) is less than his cost at T = 2).
2Note that LI2 is similar to NLI in the sense that the eroding price schedule and the reserve price are
explicitly set by the buyer, not affected by the supplier. However, under NLI, this is because of the supplier’s
cost structure, not the fact that the payments are based on the observed actual cost.
3The derivation of equilibrium bids under EPC and SI applies to any general distribution.
4Same as in the previous model (LI1), an incumbent bids his true cost from his new cost distribution
[t1 − α, t1], while other entrants submit their true types redrawn from [C, C + 1] at T = 2.
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However, this force is countered by the opportunity to participate in the second auction as




Given the bidding strategy, we can characterize the optimal non-discriminatory eroding
price schedule R(t1) = kt1, and the corresponding bid and the buyer’s expected total cost
as follows.
PROPOSITION 5.2. When R(t1) = t1 (i.e., k = 1), the buyer’s expected total cost is
minimized. Given this, the bidding strategy of a bidder t and the buyer’s expected total cost
are as follows.
B1EPC(t
1) = t1 − [t1 − E[t2I ]
]
(5.2)
ETCEPC(R∗(t)) = E[t2I(2:N)] + E[t
1
(1:N)] (5.3)
Proof. see appendix E.2 and E.3.
It is optimal for the buyer to set R(t1) = t1 which the incumbent always accepts at
T = 2. Since the supplier t continues to supply the buyer if he is selected at T = 1, his only
concern at T = 1 is to win, and hence he submits the most aggressive bid at T = 1, which
is E[t2I ] (i.e., the payment at T = 2 and his cost at T = 1 are canceled out - see equation
(5.2)). Note that the bid at T = 1 depends only on the amount of α, i,e., any supplier
shades his bid by the same amount of the expected value of α below his cost.
The buyer’s expected total cost ETCEPC(R(t1)) is given by E[B1EPC(t
1)(2:N)] + P1 ×
E[R(t1)(1:N)]+P0×E[B2EPC(t2)(2:N−1) +s], where P1 is the probability that the incumbent
accepts R(t1), and P0 = 1 − P1. Under the optimal eroding price R(t1) = t1, the buyer’s
cost at T = 1 and 2 are the expectation of the second lowest bid at T = 1 (E[t2I(2:N)])
and the expectation of the lowest R(t1) (E[t(1:N)] - the buyer pays the incumbent’s cost at
T = 1), respectively.
5Note that this is same as B1EPC(t
1) under LI1 except the last term with R′(t1) (equation (4.1) in chapter
4). This explains how the bidding behavior changes if the bidder’s bid at T = 1 can not influence on the
future payment.
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5.3 Equilibrium Bidding Strategy and the buyer’s expected
total cost under SI
Under LI1 (in chapter 4), we were unable to derive a closed form solution for the bids at
T = 1 under SI. The major reason of it is that the buyer sets the reserve price based on the
supplier’s bid at T = 1. When the buyer uses the supplier’s actual cost at T = 1 instead of
his bid, we can derive the closed bid function at T = 1 as follows.
PROPOSITION 5.3. In combination with the second period bids outlined in equation






(i) if C ≤ t1 < C + s,






(ii) if C + s ≤ t1 < min[C + s + α, C + 1],
t1 −
[
t1 − E[t2I ]−
∫ t1
C+s


















(iii) if min[C + s + α, C + 1] ≤ t1 < C + 1,
t1 −
[
t1 − E[t2I ]−
∫ t1
t1−α



























Proof. see appendix F.1.
Due to the positive switching cost, the buyer considers the new supplier only if the
reduced price is greater than the cost of switching suppliers. Thus, it is convenient to use
the effective bid(cost); the entrant’s effective bid is the positive shift of his submitted bid
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at T = 2 by amount of switching cost s (i.e., the distribution of the effective cost is FE :
FE(C + s) = 0, FE(C + 1 + s) = 1), and the incumbent’s effective bid is the same as his
submitted bid from the distribution FI .
Different from the bid under EPC, a supplier shades(inflates) his bid below(above)
his cost differently according to the relative position of costs between an incumbent and
entrants: (i) supplier t’s cost at T = 2, if he wins at T = 1, is less than the effective cost
of an entrant (t1 < C + s ⇒ t2I < C + s), (ii) the supplier’s cost as an incumbent and the
entrant’s effective cost is partly overlapped (t1 − α ≤ C + s < t1), and (iii) the supplier’s
cost as an incumbent lies in the entrant’s effective cost range (t1 − α > C + s). When
t1 < C +s, the supplier t always wins and is paid by the reserve price t1 at T = 2. Thus, his
only incentive is to win at T = 1, and hence submits the most aggressive bid. However, as
the incumbent’s and the entrant’s costs become overlapped, two effects forces the supplier
to inflate his bid (i.e., his bid is less aggressive than the case (i)); (1) the supplier’s profit
as an incumbent decreases (i.e., the payment is combination of the reserve price and the
lowest entrant’s cost which is lower than the reserve price), and (2) the probability that an
entrant wins at T = 2 and the expected profit as an entrant increase. These effects become
larger when a supplier is higher type (i.e., the profit as an incumbent E[Π2SI(t
2
I)] decreases
and the profit as an entrant E[Π2SI(t
2
E)] increases from (i) to (iii)).
Given the bidding strategy, the buyer’s expected total cost ETCSI is given by E[B1SI(t
1)(2:N)]+
E[min(B̃2SI(t
2)(2:N), r2)], where B̃2SI(t
2)(2:N) is the effective bid, (i.e., if an entrant defines
the payment, B̃2SI(t
2)(2:N) = B2SI(t
2)(2:N) + s). Given the bid in the proposition 5.3, it is as
follows.
PROPOSITION 5.4. Given the bidding strategy as in proposition 5.3, the buyer’s expected
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total cost under SI is as follows.





































In this section, we compare EPC and SI. For easy and clear insights, we use various numerical
examples. We begin by first discussing the difference between bids under EPC and SI, and
then proceed to compare the expected total costs of the buyer. After that, we discuss several
variations from our original models : new sets of entrants, discount factor, and bundling.
As we will see, our original models and results are easily applied to any of these variations.
5.4.1 Comparison of EPC and SI
Under SI, a bidder t submits less aggressive bid as his type(cost) becomes higher. This,
combined with the fact that B1EPC(t
1) = B1SI(t
1) when t1 ≤ C+s(equation (5.2) and (5.4)),
gives us the first comparison between EPC and SI.
LEMMA 5.1. Suppliers bid more (or at least equally) aggressively under EPC than under
SI, i.e., B1EPC(t
1) ≤ B1SI(t1), ∀ t1.
Figure 5.1 (i) shows B1EPC(t
1) and B1SI(t
1) when N = 6, α = 0.4, and s = 0.1.
Recall that B1EPC(t
1) does not change with N or s, while it does with α (i.e., bids shift
downward by the same amount of E[α] when α increases). However, B1SI(t
1) changes as
any of market settings changes, and does so differentially (i.e., not by the same amount for
all type). The low types (t1 ≤ C + s) always submit the most aggressive bids under any
market settings (N , α, or s). When N increases, moderate types (C + s < t1 ≤ C + s + α)
tend to increase their bids (i.e., become less aggressive), while high types (t1 < C + s + α)
actually decrease their bids (i.e., becomes more aggressive) - see figure 5.1 (ii). Note that
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both profits as an incumbent and an entrant decrease with N , i.e., entrants become more
competitive and the difference between the first and the second lowest bids decreases. For
a moderate type bidder, this reduced profit forces him to increase his bid as N increases.
However, this reduced profit at T = 2, combined with the fact that the probability of
winning at T = 2 is very small, forces the high type bidder to not inflate his bid above his
cost at T = 1 (i.e., his bid stays nearer his cost at T = 1 as N increases; e.g. when N = 20,
B1SI(t
1) = t1 for high types - figure 5.1 (ii)). As s and α increase, an incumbent becomes
competitive, and hence bidders in both moderate and high types become more aggressive
to win at T = 1. When s increases, the range of low type and moderate type increase,
and hence larger portion of bidder types submits the most aggressive bid (i.e., the range of
t1 < C + s increases) - see figure 5.1 (iii). When α increases, both B1EPC(t
1) and B1SI(t
1)
decrease - see figure 5.1 (iv).
Opposite to the case of the bid, the buyer’s expected cost at T = 2 under SI is always
less than or at least equal to that under EPC since the buyer is always able to select the
most effective bidder at T = 2 under SI (this also implies the more aggressive bid at T = 1
under EPC than that under SI, i.e., the bidder’s expected profit at T = 2 under EPC is
greater than that under SI). However, the degree of the aggressiveness of bid at T = 1 under
EPC tends to dominate the degree of the reduced payment at T = 2 under SI, and hence
we have the following observation.
OBSERVATION 5.1. In general, the buyer’s expected total cost under EPC is less than
that under SI. Conversely, SI outperforms EPC only when α and s are very small.
Table 5.1 and 5.2 illustrate the difference of the buyer’s expected total costs under
EPC and SI. As in table 5.2, ETCEPC > ETCSI when both α and s are very small (e.g.
α = s = 0.01) and N is not too small (N > 5). EPC outperforms SI best when N and s are
small and α is large. Note that this is the case where the difference of the second lowest bid
at T = 1 under SI and EPC is large. That is, when N (or s) is small, the second lowest bid
would be among the moderate or high type (if N (or s) is large, it would be among the low
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Figure 5.1: Bids under EPC and SI in various markets
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Table 5.1: Comparison of non-discrim. EPC (k = 1) and SI under LI2 (1)
s = 0.1 α = 0.4
α  N 3 4 5 6 10 20 s  N 3 4 5 6 10 20
0.1 -2.3 -1.3 -0.9 -0.7 -0.5 -0.2 0.1 -3.2 -2.5 -2.2 -1.9 -1.2 -0.4
0.2 -2.6 -1.8 -1.4 -1.2 -0.8 -0.3 0.2 -2.5 -1.9 -1.5 -1.2 -0.5 -0.1
0.3 -3.0 -2.2 -1.8 -1.6 -1.1 -0.4 0.3 -1.8 -1.3 -0.9 -0.7 -0.2 0.0
0.4 -3.2 -2.5 -2.2 -1.9 -1.2 -0.4 0.4 -1.1 -0.7 -0.5 -0.3 0.0 0.0
0.5 -3.5 -2.8 -2.5 -2.2 -1.3 -0.4 0.5 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.0
0.6 -3.7 -3.1 -2.7 -2.3 -1.4 -0.4 0.6 -0.3 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.7 -3.9 -3.3 -2.9 -2.5 -1.5 -0.5 0.7 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.8 -4.1 -3.5 -3.0 -2.6 -1.6 -0.5 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.9 -4.3 -3.6 -3.2 -2.8 -1.6 -0.5 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0






; the negative terms imply ETCEPC < ETCSI .
Table 5.2: Comparison of non-discrim. EPC (k = 1) and SI under LI2 (2)
α = s = 0.01
N 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 20 30 50
-2.4 -0.8 -0.2 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.0
of bid decreases more rapidly (check the different slope of the moderate types with different
α - see figure 5.1(iv)). This difference of bids at T = 1 makes the dominated effect on the
buyer’s expected total cost.
5.4.2 New Set of Entrants
In our original model, we assumed that the set of entrants at T = 2 are the same as in
T = 1, i.e., the buyer faces exactly same entrants at T = 2. In the other side, the buyer may
face totally different entrants at T = 2. These two, a same set and a new set of entrants,
are the extreme cases. However, as we shall see, these two cases share many similar aspects.
Hence, by observing the case of a new set of entrants and comparing it with the case of the
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same set of entrants, we fully expect that procurement settings situated between these two
(i.e., the model in which the buyer faces partly new entrants and partly same entrants as
in T = 1) will also yield the similar results.
So what would (or would not) change when the buyer faces the new set of entrants
instead of the same set of them? The independent cost distribution of entrants when the
buyer faces the same set of them indicates the following lemma.
LEMMA 5.2. The buyer’s expected costs at T = 2 are the same with new and same set of
entrants under both procurement mechanisms, EPC and SI.
However it is not the case in the buyer’s expected cost at T = 1. With the new set
of entrants, a bidder has no opportunity to participate in and possibly win the auction at
T = 2, if he loses at T = 1. This makes a bidder always shade his bid below his cost at
T = 1 (i.e., the profit as an entrant which forces him to inflate his bid does no longer exist).






E)] terms respectively (i.e., bids with new set of
entrants are more aggressive than those with same set of entrants because the terms which
force bidders to inflate their bids disappear).
PROPOSITION 5.5. When the buyer faces a new set of entrants at T = 2, she minimizes
her expected total cost when R∗(t1) = t1 (i.e., k = 1), and hence her expected total costs
under EPC are the same with new and same set of entrants.
Proof. see appendix E.2.1 and E.3.1
By similar procedure as in the same set of entrants, it is optimal for the buyer to set
R∗(t1) = t1 (k = 1) under EPC when there are a new set of entrants at T = 2. Thus, the
bidding strategy at T = 1 under EPC, B1EPC(t
1) does not change under either a new or a
same set of entrants, so does the buyer’s expected cost at T = 1. Combined with the lemma
5.2, the buyer’s expected total cost under EPC remains the same with the new or the same
set of entrants.
Thus the only difference between the new and the same set of entrants is B1SI(t
1). By
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Table 5.3: Comparison of non-discrim. EPC (k = 1) and SI under LI2 (1) : new set of
entrants
s = 0.1 α = 0.4
α  N 3 4 5 6 10 20 s  N 3 4 5 6 10 20
0.1 -0.4 -0.3 -0.3 -0.4 -0.4 -0.2 0.1 -2.0 -2.0 -1.9 -1.8 -1.2 -0.4
0.2 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -0.8 -0.3 0.2 -1.7 -1.6 -1.4 -1.2 -0.5 -0.1
0.3 -1.6 -1.5 -1.5 -1.4 -1.0 -0.4 0.3 -1.3 -1.1 -0.8 -0.6 -0.2 0.0
0.4 -2.0 -2.0 -1.9 -1.8 -1.2 -0.4 0.4 -0.9 -0.7 -0.4 -0.3 0.0 0.0
0.5 -2.5 -2.4 -2.2 -2.0 -1.3 -0.4 0.5 -0.5 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.0
0.6 -2.8 -2.7 -2.5 -2.2 -1.4 -0.4 0.6 -0.3 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.7 -3.1 -2.9 -2.7 -2.4 -1.5 -0.5 0.7 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.8 -3.4 -3.2 -2.8 -2.5 -1.6 -0.5 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.9 -3.6 -3.4 -3.0 -2.7 -1.6 -0.5 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0






; the negative terms imply ETCEPC < ETCSI .
Table 5.4: Comparison of non-discrim. EPC (k = 1) and SI under LI2 (2) : new set of
entrants
α = s = 0.01
N 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 20 30 50
0.5 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.3 0.1 0.0
the fact that the bids with the new set of entrants are more aggressive than those with the
same set the following proposition is straightforward.
PROPOSITION 5.6. The performance of SI with the new set of entrants improves com-
pared to that with the same set of entrants.
It is clear if we compare table 5.1 (with the same set of entrants) and 5.3 (with the new
set of entrants). Even if the performance of SI improves, EPC still outperforms SI as with
the same set of entrants in most market settings. However, the difference between EPC















































(ii) N = 3, α = 0.1, s = 0.1
Figure 5.2: Change of bids with same and new set of entrants
example, under the market settings of N = 6, α = 0.6 and s = 0.1, and N = 3, α = s = 0.1,
EPC outperforms SI by 2.3% with the same set of entrants, while EPC outperforms SI
by 2.2% in formal case(N = 6, α = 0.6 and s = 0.1) and by 0.4% in latter case(N = 3,
α = s = 0.1) with the new set of entrants. Again, this tendency comes from the different
bidding behaviors at T = 1 under SI. That is, under SI, the bid at T = 1 become very
aggressive if there is no chance of the second auction compared to the bid with the chance,
when N , α and s are small. Recall that when α or s is small, the inflation of bid is greater
under SI with same entrants (see figure 5.1 (iii) and (iv)). This inflation disappears if the
bidder has no additional chance for the auction at T = 2. This is also the case of small N ,
where higher types inflate their bid above their costs with same entrants. With large N ,
the expected profit as an incumbent as well as an entrant would be similar with the same
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entrants and new entrants, and hence the bidding strategy would not change a lot. See
figure 5.2 for the difference of bidding strategies under SI when N = 6, α = 0.6 and s = 0.1,
and N = 3, α = s = 0.1 to see why the latter market setting improves the performance of
SI better than the formal setting.
5.4.3 Discount Factor δ
Another interesting variance from our original model is a discount factor. In our original
model, we assumed that the future cost (T = 2) is same important as the present cost
(T = 1) to the buyer. In this section, we show how the results would change if a discount
factor δ is less than 1 (in the original model, δ might be considered as 1). The buyer’s
expected total cost under procurement mechanism M (EPC or SI) with the discount factor
δ is then,
ETCM = EC1M + δEC
2
M , (5.6)
where ECTM is the buyer’s cost under mechanism M at time T . As δ decreases, the
degree of the expected cost at T = 2 becomes less significant. Thus, the impact of the
first period becomes relatively larger. Then how would the buyer’s cost at T = 1 (i.e. the
suppliers’ bids at T = 1) change?
Given a discount factor δ, supplier t’s bid at T = 1 under procurement mechanism M
is as follows.
B1M (t
1) = t1 − δE[Π2M (t2I)] + δE[Π2M (t2E)], 0 < δ < 1 (5.7)
Under EPC, the value of δ does not affect the choice of the optimal R∗ since δ is
multiplied to all R(t1) in ETCEPC .
LEMMA 5.3. With considering the discount factor δ < 1, the buyer minimizes her expected
total cost when R∗(t1) = t1 (i.e. k = 1).
As a result, supplier t shades his bid at T = 1 below his cost by amount of δE[Π2M (t
2
I)]













BSI(t) (δ = 1)
t
BSI(t) (δ = 0.7 )
BEPC(t) (δ = 0.7 )
BEPC(t) (δ = 1 )
Figure 5.3: Change of bids when δ =1 and 0.7 (N = 6, α = 0.4, s = 0.1)
their costs by the same amount under EPC. Under SI, however, δ makes the impact of the
expected profit at T = 2 on supplier t’s bid at T = 1 differentially according to supplier’s
type (see figure 5.3 for the change of bids when δ = 1 and 0.7). For a low type supplier, the
impact of δ is more significant on his expected profit as an incumbent E[Π2M (t
2
I)] than his
profit as an entrant E[Π2M (t
2
E)]. Thus, his bid would be less aggressive than that with δ = 1
case. Especially, for a supplier t1 < C +s, he shades his bid by amount of δE[Π2M (t
2
I)] which
is same as under EPC. Recall that the high cost at T = 1 forces a high supplier type to
inflate the bid above his cost when δ = 1. With δ < 1, the second chance is less significant
to him, and hence he inflates the bid less than that when δ = 1 (see figure 5.3). That is, as
δ decreases, all supplier types inflate their bids from their bids with δ = 1 under EPC, while
some supplier types (i.e. high types) may shade more from their bids with δ = 1 under SI.
OBSERVATION 5.2. As the buyer values more the current contract than the future
contract (i.e. δ decreases), the performance of SI improves.







































Figure 5.4: Change of the buyer’s expected total costs under EPC and SI with δ (N = 6,
α = 0.4, s = 0.1)
of the buyer at T = 1 under SI is less than that under EPC, and hence SI becomes more
attractive compared to the case of δ = 1. Figure 5.4 illustrates the comparison of the
buyer’s expected costs under EPC and SI as δ changes. The difference between EPC and
SI decreases as δ decreases. Note that the difference of the buyer’s expected cost at T = 2
is the same regardless of δ since the expected cost at T = 2 changes at the same rate either
EPC and SI, while the difference at T = 1 decreases when δ decreases.
5.4.4 Bundling
Under EPC and SI, the buyer commits to a short term contract, in which she renews her
contract after the first period with her incumbent or possibly a new supplier. Under EPC,
it is optimal that the buyer keeps her incumbent at T = 2 (R∗(t1) = t1). That is, EPC with
the optimal R(t1) = t1 becomes equivalent to the long term contract with the supplier who
wins at T = 1. Then, does it mean that the buyer’s optimal choice of R(t1) would still be
t1 if she commits a long term contract?
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When the buyer commits a long term contract with eroding price schedule R(t1) (i.e.
she bundles her eroding price contract), she auctions off both units at T = 1, and the lowest
bidder wins the entire contract at different payments at T = 1 and 2 (i.e. the supplier t is
paid by the lowest rejected bid for the first unit, and the eroding price R(t1) for the second
unit). Note that in the long term contract, the winning supplier also commits to supply
the buyer in both time periods even if his cost is greater than the eroding price at T = 2
(t2I > R(t
1)).
The supplier t’s bid at T = 1 would be t1 − (R(t1)−E[t2I ]
)
; his only incentive is to win
at T = 1, and hence he shades his bid below his cost by amount of the expected profit at
T = 2. The cost of the buyer at T = 2 is R(t1) (no switching cost s is involved). Thus,





The first three terms are the expected second lowest bid at T = 1 (R(t1) = kt1), and the
last term is the expected cost of the buyer at T = 2 (i.e. the expected eroding price of
an incumbent). From this, it is straightforward that k = 1 minimizes the buyer’s expected
total cost same as in the short term contract.
PROPOSITION 5.7. When the buyer bundles the eroding price contract, she minimizes
her cost with R(t1) = t1 (i.e. k = 1), and hence the bidding strategy of a bidder t and the
buyer’s expected total cost are the same as under the short term contract (i.e., EPC).
The buyer may simply bundle the entire contract by using auction only, in which the
buyer selects her supplier for both periods, and the payment of both units are determined
by the lowest rejected price at T = 1. Since the winner of the auction supplies the buyer
for whole two units at the same bid price, the nice truth-telling properties of a one-shot
single-unit Vickrey auction carry over to this bundle format (i.e. the supplier t’s bid at
T = 1 is same as t
1+t2I
2 ). The buyer’s expected total cost is as follows.
PROPOSITION 5.8. When the buyer conducts the bundle auction(BA), the buyer’s ex-
pected total cost is given by E[t1(2:N)] + E[t
2
I(2:N)].
Intuitively, BA can not outperform SI because the buyer fails to find more effective
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Table 5.5: Comparison of Sequential and Bundle auctions under LI2 (1)
s = 0.1 α = 0.4
α  N 3 4 5 6 10 20 s  N 3 4 5 6 10 20
0.1 6.8 6.5 5.9 5.3 3.6 2.1 0.1 6.3 5.6 4.9 4.4 3.1 2.1
0.2 6.6 6.1 5.4 4.8 3.3 2.0 0.2 7.1 6.3 5.6 5.1 3.8 2.4
0.3 6.4 5.8 5.1 4.6 3.2 2.0 0.3 7.9 7.0 6.3 5.7 4.2 2.5
0.4 6.3 5.6 4.9 4.4 3.1 2.1 0.4 8.6 7.6 6.8 6.1 4.4 2.5
0.5 6.2 5.4 4.8 4.3 3.1 2.1 0.5 9.1 8.0 7.1 6.3 4.4 2.5
0.6 6.1 5.4 4.7 4.2 3.1 2.1 0.6 9.5 8.2 7.2 6.4 4.4 2.5
0.7 6.1 5.3 4.7 4.2 3.2 2.2 0.7 9.7 8.3 7.2 6.4 4.4 2.5
0.8 6.1 5.3 4.7 4.2 3.2 2.3 0.8 9.8 8.3 7.3 6.4 4.4 2.5
0.9 6.2 5.4 4.7 4.3 3.3 2.3 0.9 9.8 8.4 7.3 6.4 4.4 2.5






; BA is a bundle auction
Table 5.6: Comparison of Sequential and Bundle auctions under LI2 (2)
α = s = 0.01
N 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 20 30 50
6.5 6.8 6.5 6.0 5.5 5.1 4.7 4.4 2.4 1.7 1.0
supplier at T = 2 (⇒ ETCBA > ETCSI(orEPC))6. Table 5.5 and 5.6 show some numerical
comparisons between SI and BA. Note that the difference increases as N and α decrease,
and s increases7.
5.5 Comparisons of LI1 and LI2 : Should the buyer audit
the supplier’s cost?
The only difference between LI2 and LI1(chapter 4) is whether the supplier’s bid at T = 1
directly affects the buyer’s future price or not. Under LI1, the buyer sets her eroding price
6It is straightforward to see that ETCEPC < ETCBA because E[t(1:N)] < E[t(2:N)].
7In appendix H, we discuss the bundling contracts under NLI and LI1. Different from the case under
LI2, the buyer’s expected total costs under the bundling eroding price contract and the bundling auction
are the same in either model, NLI and LI1. Especially, under LI1, the choice of the optimal R(t1) (i.e. k)
does not matter to the buyer ; any k yields the same output to the buyer.
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under EPC and reserve price under SI based on the supplier’s bid at T = 1, while she sets
those based on the supplier’s actual cost at T = 1 under LI2. As we have seen, this made
the significantly different impact on the comparisons between EPC and SI : the bidder’s
bidding behavior and the performance of the procurement mechanisms.
Under the same market setting (N , α and s), the performance under SI tends to be
better than that under EPC under LI1 (i.e. the buyer’s expected total cost under SI is
lower than that under EPC), while the opposite happens under LI2 (see table 4.2 and 5.1).
Note that the buyer’s expected total costs at T = 2 are the same under LI1 and LI2 in
equilibrium. Thus it is clear that the different results owe to the different bidding behaviors
at T = 1 under LI1 and LI2 (see figure 4.3 for bids under LI1 and 5.1 under LI2).
Recall that under LI2, BEPC(t1) < BSI(t1) for t1 > C + s, and BEPC(t1) = BSI(t1) for
the low type supplier (t1 ≤ C + s), i.e. the buyer’s expected cost at T = 1 under EPC is
always lower than that under SI (see lemma 5.1). Under LI1, the high chance of winning
at T = 1, combined with the fact that the payment at T = 2 would be decided based on
the bid at T = 1 (i.e. the future price is based on the bid (i.e. the reported cost), not the
actual cost), forces the low type supplier to bid less aggressively than the high type supplier
under both EPC and SI. Note that the bid under SI can be less than that under EPC for
moderate or even low type suppliers (see figure 4.3 (i) and (ii)). Hence, it is not always
true that the bid under EPC is less than or same as that under SI.
The buyer’s expected cost at T = 1 is determined by the second lowest bid and this
is more likely set from one of the moderate (or high) group suppliers (t1 > C + s). Thus
the difference between EPC and SI becomes larger under LI2, while it is not always true
under LI1. Therefore, under LI2, it is more likely that EPC outperforms SI in many market
setting, while the opposite can be true under LI1. That is, under LI2, the lower expected
cost of the buyer at T = 1 under EPC dominates the lower cost at T = 2 under SI. Under
LI1, the difference of the buyer’s cost at T = 1 under EPC and SI is not large enough to
dominate the lower buyer’s cost at T = 2 under SI, or even there is the case where the
buyer’s cost at T = 1 under SI can be lower than that under EPC.
This suggests us that, if it is not too costly for the buyer to audit the supplier for his
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cost after the production (and before the second contract), the long term relationship with
a supplier (EPC) would be a better choice rather than the short term contracts (SI).
For example, when N = 6, α = 0.4 and s = 0.1, the relationships of the buyer’s expected
total costs between EPC and SI are as follows (ETCLIxM denotes the buyer’s expected total







Since the buyer can extract more information rent from the supplier by observing his
true cost, she can lower her cost under LI2 compared to that under LI1. Thus, the buyer’s








That is, if the cost of auditing the supplier is less than ETCLI1SI − ETCLI2EPC , then it
would be worthwhile for the buyer to commit the long term contract with the supplier.
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CHAPTER VI
SEQUENTIAL AUCTIONS WITH OPTIMAL RESERVE
PRICES (BASED ON NLI)
So far we examined the procurement mechanisms which are frequently used in practice.
Different from EPC, where the buyer explicitly sets one of the payments at T = 2 by eroding
price (the other is the price set by the auction among entrants, if any), the submitted bids
at T = 2 determines the buyer’s payment at T = 2 under SI. However, the buyer uses a
reserve price under SI for trying to exert some control over the price at T = 2. Under our
SI model (in NLI), it was r2 = C + 1 − α. While this choice of the reserve price is very
straightforward and intuitive (i.e., the buyer will not pay above the maximum incumbent’s
cost at T = 2), it is obvious that the buyer can save more money by choosing the reserve
price more systematically. First, the buyer may set the reserve price at T = 1 by trade off
between the low payment and the possibility to not have any supplier (so possibly less than
C + 1). Recall that the buyer has no control over the price at T = 1 under SI. Under SI,
the reserve price at T = 1 can be considered as C + 1, at which the buyer select the reserve
to maximize the number of suppliers who were eligible to participate at T = 2. Second, it
is well-known that the discriminatory reserve price rule should be applied for asymmetric
bidders (under SI, the reserve price at T = 2 are the same for both an incumbent and
entrants).
In this chapter, we study the selection of the optimal reserve prices in each of period
under the sequential procurement setting and make comparisons with other mechanisms,
SI and EPC.
6.1 Optimal reserve prices model(OPT)
The model is same as SI under NLI : the buyer auctions off short term contract and selects
the winning supplier in each of two periods via a Vickrey auction. Different from SI,
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the buyer sets the reserve prices in both periods (possibly different reserve prices for an
incumbent, entrants, etc). We assume that the buyer announces the reserve prices at T = 1
and 2 in the beginning of T = 1.1 If there is no supplier who satisfies the reserve price in
either periods, the buyer should incur some opportunity cost, i.e, the buyer might purchase
the product at the noncompetitive price. In our model, we assume that if she fails to select
her winner from N suppliers, she incurs her opportunity cost as amount of C + 1 at T = 1,
and C + s + 1 at T = 2.
To obtain the optimal solution of minimizing her expected total cost, the buyer has four





1 ∈ [C, C + 1], r20, r2E ∈ [C + s, C + 1 + s],
and r2I ∈ [C−α, C +1−α]. rT is a reserve price at time T . Depending on the reserve price
at T = 1 (r1), the buyer faces two possible situations at T = 2 : (1) there is no incumbent
supplier at T = 2, i.e., the buyer does not purchase from the suppliers at T = 1, and (2)
there is an incumbent at T = 2. In the first case, the buyer needs to determine a reserve
price at T = 2 (r20) against N symmetric bidders at T = 2, while she should determine
two (discriminatory) reserve prices in the second setting, one for the incumbent (r2I ) and
another for the N − 1 entrants (r2E).
Since bidders are rational, they incorporate the expected profit at T = 2 when they
submit their bids at T = 1. Furthermore, the reserve prices at T = 2 as well as at T = 1
affect the equilibrium bidding strategy at T = 1, as defined in the following equation.
B1OPT (t
1) = t1 − E[Π2(t2I)] + (1− p0(t1))E[Π21(t2E)] + p0(t1)E[Π20(t2E)], (6.1)
where p0 is the probability that no supplier satisfies the buyer’s reserve price at T = 1.
Bidder t shades/inflates his bid by amount of the expected profit at T = 2. The bidder t’s
profit as an incumbent at T = 2 is E[Π2(t2I)]. Bidder t’s expected profit as an entrant can
be either E[Π21(t
2
E)], if there is an incumbent supplier at T = 2 (and hence N − 1 entrants),
or E[Π20(t
2
E)] if there is no incumbent (i.e., N symmetric entrants).
Note that p0 is a function of t1 as well as r1, i.e., for a bidder whose cost at T = 1 is less
1Since there is no additional information after the first auction, the outcome would be the same whether
the buyer announces the reserve prices at T = 2 before or after the second auction.
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than the buyer’s reserve price r1 (t1 ≤ r1), the probability that there exists an incumbent
at T = 2 is always 1 (p0 = 0). The buyer pays min[B1(2:N)(t
1), r1] if t1 ≤ r1, and the
opportunity cost otherwise. Thus, the bidding strategy we are interested in is only for
the type no greater than r1, and hence B1OPT (t
1(≤ r1)) = t1 − E[Π2(t2I)] + E[Π21(t2E)] (see
appendix J.1 for detailed formulations of E[Π2(t2I)] and E[Π
2(t2E)]).
Given the bidding strategy at T = 1 and 2 (the bidding strategy at T = 2 is true
cost-telling by Vickery rule), the buyer finds her optimal reserve prices which minimize her
expected total cost, ETCOPT (r).
ETCOPT (r) = EC1(r1, r2I , r
2
E) + (1− p0(r1))EC21 (r2I , r2E) + p0(r1)EC20 (r20), (6.2)
where EC1 is the expected cost at T = 1, EC2I is the expected cost at T = 2 if there is
an incumbent (I = 1), or no incumbent (I = 0). Note that EC1 is not a function of r20 (see
appendix J.2 for detailed formulations of EC1, EC2I ).




0), combined with the fact that N entrants are symmetric,
the optimal r20 is straightforward by Myerson[34].
LEMMA 6.1. The optimal reserve price at T = 2, when there exists no incumbent, is




= C + 1 + s (6.3)
The allocation and the payment rules in EC1 and EC20 are simple in the sense that the
bidders are symmetric, i.e., the lowest bidder t wins, if his bid is no greater than the reserve
price, with the payment of min[reserve price, the lowest rejected bid], or the buyer incurs
the opportunity cost, if there is no winner. If there exists an incumbent at T = 2, bidders
become asymmetric. To obtain EC21 , for consistency, the allocation and the payment rules
are set as follows;
• allocation rule A winning supplier is the lowest bidding supplier among bidders whose
costs are no greater than the corresponding reserve prices at T = 2.
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• payment rule The payment is min[reserve price of the winning supplier, the lowest
rejected bid, if any] (see Appendix J.2 for detail).
Different from r20, the other three variables r
1, r2I , and r
2
E are interdependent (equation
(6.2), for explicit expression of ETCOPT (r), see appendix J.2), and hence they do not give
an explicit closed-form solution. Hence, in the next section, we solve it numerically by
approximation method.
6.2 Analysis
We assume that costs are drawn from uniform distributions. We approximate the uniform
distribution of a supplier’s cost, the reserve prices r1, r2I , and r
2
E by discretizing the corre-
sponding intervals of [C, C + 1], [C −α, C + 1−α], and [C + s, C + 1 + s] by increments of
1
n (results illustrated in this section are based on experiments with n = 200). To capture
a wide spectrum of market settings, we varied the experimental settings, i.e., the values of
α, s, and N , as in table 6.1.
Table 6.1: Parameters used in numerical examples
C 1 : t1 ∼ U [1, 2]
N 2, 3, 4, 5, . . ., 10, 20, 30, 40, 50
α 0.01, 0.03, 0.05, 0.1, 0.2, . . ., 0.5
s 0.01, 0.03, 0.05, 0.1, 0.2, . . ., 0.5
We first observe the characters of the optimal reserve prices in each period under OPT
and then proceed to the comparisons with SI and EPC.
It is well know from Myerson[34] and Riley and Samuelson[35] that the optimal reserve
price in the model of symmetric bidders in one period does not depend on the number of
bidders, N (in our model, r20 is the case ; see r
2
0 in table 6.2). However, if the model deviates
from it, i.e., if there are (1) multiple periods (observation 6.1), and/or (2) asymmetric
bidders (observation 6.2 and 6.3), we found that the choice of the optimal reserve price
becomes a function of N .
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Table 6.2: Optimal reserve prices
Market Reserve Prices Probability of a bidder’s cost
being below reserve price, Pr(tTi ≤ rTi )





1 ≤ r1 t2E ≤ r20 t2I ≤ r2I t2E ≤ r2E
2 1.690 1.600 1.800 1.105 0.690 0.5 1 0.005
4 1.620 1.600 1.800 1.290 0.620 0.5 1 0.190
6 0.2 0.1 1.585 1.600 1.800 1.305 0.585 0.5 1 0.205
8 1.565 1.600 1.800 1.315 0.565 0.5 1 0.215
10 1.555 1.600 1.800 1.315 0.555 0.5 1 0.215
20 1.540 1.600 1.800 1.325 0.540 0.5 1 0.225
0.05 1.570 1.600 1.950 1.330 0.570 0.5 1 0.230
0.1 1.585 1.600 1.900 1.320 0.585 0.5 1 0.220
4 0.2 0.1 1.620 1.600 1.800 1.290 0.620 0.5 1 0.190
0.3 1.660 1.600 1.700 1.265 0.660 0.5 1 0.165
0.4 1.705 1.600 1.600 1.235 0.705 0.5 1 0.135
0.5 1.750 1.600 1.500 1.210 0.750 0.5 1 0.110
0.05 1.605 1.550 1.800 1.255 0.605 0.5 1 0.205
0.1 1.620 1.600 1.800 1.290 0.620 0.5 1 0.190
4 0.2 0.2 1.660 1.700 1.800 1.365 0.660 0.5 1 0.165
0.3 1.705 1.800 1.800 1.435 0.705 0.5 1 0.135
0.4 1.750 1.900 1.800 1.510 0.750 0.5 1 0.110
0.5 1.795 2.000 1.800 1.580 0.795 0.5 1 0.080
OBSERVATION 6.1. Under OPT, when N decreases, and/or α and s increase, r1 in-
creases.
Note that in two periods, the optimal choice of r1 depends on the cost shifts at T = 2
by α and s (i.e., the incumbent’s and the entrant’s costs) as well as N . Table 6.2 illustrates
the change of r1 for different values of N , α and s. For example, when N decreases from 20
to 2, r1 increases from 1.54 to 1.69, and when α increases from 0.05 to 0.5, it increases from
1.57 to 1.752. When N is small, and α and s are large, the winner at T = 1 has a large
2We show the examples that the buyer considers more than half of the supplier types in table 6.2.
However, with large N (e.g. 50), the buyer would consider less than half of types (47%).
66
(expected) cost advantage over his competitors at T = 2. And hence, the expected profit
at T = 2 is large, which incents bidders to bid aggressively at T = 1. To maximize this
competitive pressure, the buyer sets a high reserve, which in turn increases the probability
that the buyer will incur a low cost at T = 2 by keeping an incumbent at T = 2 (as r1
increases, p0 decreases).
When the buyer faces asymmetric bidders (i.e., an incumbent and entrants), the optimal
choices of reserve prices for difference bidders (r2I and r
2
E) are as follows.
OBSERVATION 6.2. Under OPT, for any market setting (N, α, s), the buyer discrim-
inates against entrants and in favor of the incumbent, i.e., the buyer guarantees not to
exclude any incumbent types from the auction at T = 2 and sets r2I = C + 1− α, while she
sets r2E < C + 1 + s.
By setting r2I = C + 1 − α, the buyer does not exclude any type of incumbent (i.e.,
Pr(t2I > r
2
I ) = 0), while she finds it optimal to set a reserve that excludes some entrant
types. For example, in table 6.2(last column), the buyer considers less than 30 % of entrant
types.
The sequential nature of the bidding events reinforces the difference between r2I and
r2E . Suppose that there is only one auction event, and that the bidders are asymmetric
: one bidder with a cost drawn from distribution FI , and N − 1 bidders with their costs






= C +1+ s, i = {I, E}. Under the uniform distribution, Pr(t2I ≤ r2I ) = 1+α+s2
and Pr(t2E ≤ r2E) = 12 . Clearly, if α + s < 1, Pr(t2I ≤ r2I ) < 1. The buyer finds it
optimal to exclude only the high incumbent types, while she always excludes half of the
entrant types. When this asymmetric auction becomes the second bidding event, as in our
model, the buyer favors the incumbent even more by setting r2I to its highest possible level,
C + 1− α (Pr(t2I ≤ r2I ) = 1), but become more strict towards entrants (by setting r2E such
that Pr(t2E ≤ r2E) < 12).
By allowing only a small set of entrant types to potentially displace the incumbent as her
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M ETCM reserve type
(M) (total) price portion§
EPC 1.020 1.674 2.693 r1 2(= C + 1) 1
r2I
† 1.683(= R∗) 0.88
r2E
‡ 2(= C + 1) 1
SI 1.258 1.425 2.682 r1 2(= C + 1) 1
r2I 1.8(= C + 1− α) 1
r2E 1.8(= C + 1− α) 0.7
OPT 1.104 1.536 2.640 r1 1.62 0.62
(EC20 = 1.488) r
2
0 1.6 0.5
(EC21 = 1.537) r
2
I 1.8(= C + 1− α) 1
r2E 1.29 0.19
§ portion of cost types which the buyer is willing to consider as a supplier - normalized as
1.
†, ‡ under EPC, the reserve price is conditional.
supplier at T = 2, the buyer might risk excluding a low-cost entrant at T = 23. However,
this risk is outweighed by the aggressive bidding behavior it induces at T = 1. To see
this, we compare the expected cost at T = 2 if an incumbent exists under OPT with the
expected cost at T = 2 under SI. The reserve prices at T = 2 under SI can be considered
to be r2I = r
2
E = C + 1 − α, and hence the only difference from OPT is r2E . For example,
when N = 4, α = 0.2, and s = 0.1, the expected costs at T = 2 with the existence of
an incumbent(EC21 ) are 1.537 under OPT and 1.425 under SI, respectively (see table 6.3).
The optimal r2E actually does not reduce the expected cost at T = 2 under OPT. However,
combined with the choice of r2I = C +1−α and r1(observation 6.1), the choice of r2E reduces
the expected cost at T = 1 under OPT; the bidders bid very aggressively to win at T = 1
(see figure 6.1) because the expected profit at T = 2 as an incumbent is considerably larger
than that as an entrant (compare the expected profit as an incumbent E[Π2(t2I)] and as an








E is an entrant’ cost and t
2
I is an incumbent
cost at T = 2). The buyer would pay min[t2I , r
2
E ] instead of r
2
I , if the buyer sets r
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Figure 6.1: Bids under SI and OPT at T = 2 : N = 4, α = 0.2, s = 0.1
entrant E[Π2(t2E)] in figure 6.1). A reserve of r
2
I = C + 1− α also protects the buyer from
incurring the opportunity cost at T = 2 (= C + 1 + s) (there always exists one supplier
whose cost is no greater than the reserve price at T = 2). In addition, by setting r1 < C +1,
the buyer cuts off high cost types at T = 1 (under SI, r1 = C + 1, hence there is no cut-off
for any types). In table 6.3, the expected costs at T = 1 are 1.104 under OPT (EC1OPT )
and 1.258 under SI (EC1SI), respectively.
Under EPC, the reserve prices facing entrants at T = 2 are conditional in the sense




Different from OPT (or SI), the buyer may discriminate against an incumbent in the sense
that the buyer considers a partial set of the incumbent type when R∗ < R̂(< C + 1 − α),
while she does not exclude any type of entrants by (implicitly) setting r2E = C+1 (recall that
interpreting a EPC mechanism as a choice of reserves does not capture all of its dynamics.
Under EPC, the incumbent faces a reserve of r2I , but is given first priority to accept/reject
the contract. Only after he has rejected, the entrants have a chance to replace him. Hence
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there is no direct competition between the incumbent and entrants at T = 2.). From the
illustrated example in table 6.3(N = 4, α = 0.2, s = 0.1), the optimal R is less than
C + 1 − α(the buyer considers the lowest 88% of incumbent types), while she accepts any
type of an entrant. However, by the incumbent’s first right to accept/refuse the contract
at T = 2, the expected profit as an incumbent under EPC is greater than that under OPT.
(E[Π2EPC(t
2




I)] in figure 6.1)
4. Thus, the bid under EPC
would be more aggressive than that under OPT. However, these reserve prices under EPC,
combined with the fact that the reserve prices are conditional, give the buyer a higher
expected cost at T = 2 under EPC (1.674) compare with that under OPT (1.536).
While the buyer always sets r2I = C + 1 − α under any given market settings, the
buyer is willing to consider a larger set of the entrant types when the entrant become more
competitive as in the following observation (see table 6.2).
OBSERVATION 6.3. When N increases, and/or α and s decreases, the optimal reserve
for entrants at T = 2 increases.
So far, we observed the characters of the optimal reserve prices under sequential auc-
tions(OPT) and the dynamics of the reserve prices SI(EPC) and OPT, i.e., the change of a
supplier’s expected cost at T = 2 as an incumbent and an entrant by different reserve prices
and the effect on the buyer’s expected costs in each period. Given this, we can establish
the expected cost difference between SI(EPC) and OPT as change of market settings (see
table 6.4 and 6.5).
OBSERVATION 6.4. When a value of any market setting (N , α or s) increase, the cost
difference between SI (or EPC) and OPT decreases.
As α and s increase, the entrants become less competitive, and hence the buyer would set
the reserve price for entrants close to the lowest possible cost type (r2E ' C+s) (observation
6.3), while she sets r1 close to C + 1 (observation 6.1). Thus, OPT becomes similar to SI
(or EPC) ; with large α and s, there is a very small chance that an entrant wins the auction
4Suppose that supplier t’s cost at T = 2 is 1.5. Under EPC, he would accepts R∗ = 1.683 with the profit
0.183, while he might not win at T = 2 if there is an entrant whose cost is less than r2E = 1.29.
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Table 6.4: Comparison of SI and OPT
s = 0.1 α = 0.2
α  N 4 6 8 10 20 s  N 4 6 8 10 20
0.05 2.03 0.80 0.33 0.14 0.00 0.05 1.78 0.82 0.39 0.19 0.01
0.1 1.90 0.81 0.36 0.16 0.00 0.1 1.58 0.79 0.40 0.20 0.01
0.2 1.58 0.79 0.40 0.20 0.01 0.2 1.19 0.70 0.40 0.23 0.02
0.3 1.23 0.72 0.42 0.24 0.02 0.3 0.81 0.56 0.37 0.24 0.03
0.4 0.88 0.61 0.40 0.26 0.03 0.4 0.48 0.39 0.30 0.22 0.04
0.5 0.55 0.45 0.34 0.25 0.05 0.5 0.24 0.23 0.20 0.16 0.05






Table 6.5: Comparison of EPC and OPT
s = 0.1 α = 0.2
α  N 4 6 8 10 20 s  N 4 6 8 10 20
0.05 2.51 1.33 0.72 0.43 0.10 0.05 2.24 1.37 0.79 0.49 0.10
0.1 2.37 1.34 0.75 0.45 0.10 0.1 2.00 1.33 0.80 0.50 0.10
0.2 2.00 1.33 0.80 0.50 0.10 0.2 1.42 1.21 0.80 0.52 0.11
0.3 1.48 1.26 0.83 0.54 0.11 0.3 0.83 1.01 0.75 0.52 0.12
0.4 0.90 1.10 0.81 0.57 0.13 0.4 0.43 0.69 0.63 0.49 0.13
0.5 0.48 0.79 0.72 0.56 0.15 0.5 0.18 0.31 0.41 0.39 0.14






under SI (or EPC), and the buyer excludes all (or most of) the entrant under OPT. When
α + s ≥ 1, SI (or EPC) converges to OPT.
When N increases, there exists less difference among an incumbent and entrants. From
the observation 6.1 and observation 6.3, the buyer sets r1 close to C (i.e., p0 increases) and
r2E close to C + s + 1. That is, the buyer becomes less strict towards entrants who become




Our main interests were : (i) to study the optimal design of an eroding price contract when
suppliers experience learning by doing and (ii) to establish when/if a buyer is better off
committing to a single supplier in return for the supplier offering her a more competitive
price. We asked these questions in different cost frameworks, NLI , LI1, and LI2. We found
that,
• Under both LI1 and LI2 where F follows a uniform distribution, it is optimal for
the buyer to always guarantee her incumbent supplier a non-negative profit at T = 2
when using a non-discriminatory price schedule, i.e., R(t1) = t1 ∀t1. The buyer
can further reduce her expected costs by using a discriminatory price mechanism.
However, we found the additional cost savings to be very small, suggesting that the
added complexity of designing of discriminatory EPC is not warranted.
• In contrast, the buyer may not find it optimal to guarantee the incumbent supplier
her business under NLI (derived for general cost distribution F ).
• Even in the presence of learning by doing, a buyer is often better off running sequential
auctions with a reserve price, rather than limiting competition and contracting with
a single supplier in the hopes of extracting a better future price. Our numerical
examples show that the cost difference between the two mechanisms is very small
under NLI, but can be substantial under LI1 and LI2.
Moreover, by extending models in various ways, we found that,
• Under LI1 (and LI2), the incumbent locks-in his cost at T = 2, and hence a buyer
would be better off by not locking in a supplier for two periods and should instead
run SI when the entrant’s cost distribution shifts downward.
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• Under NLI and LI1, the buyer is better off not bundling her contract,1 while under
LI2, the buyer is indifferent of using either the short-term or long-term contract when
she uses an eroding price contract.
• The buyer’s ability to audit the supplier’s actual cost makes a significant impact on
the performance of the procurement mechanisms. The buyer is better off by keeping
the relationship with her incumbent if auditing is not too costly.
• The buyer can reduce her expected cost under the sequential auctions by optimally
selecting the reserve prices. Especially, the buyer favors her incumbent against en-
trants by always accepting her incumbent (i.e., incumbent’s reserve price is always set
to be his highest cost).
It is important to note that we have labeled the cost reduction that occurs at T = 2
as a learning by doing effect. However, our analysis and results apply equally for similar
manifestations of economies of scale. We also considered a setting where the buyer has
a known demand of Q in each period. It is possible that the buyer has only an estimate
of her demand in each period, E[Q]. However, as long as both the buyer and seller’s are
risk-neutral, our analysis and results carry over.
There are a number of ways to expand our models and test the robustness of our results.
Especially, we suggest some interesting extensions of our model in the hopes of bridging our
work with the existing works.
First, it would be interesting to extend our model to include settings where the suppliers
can reduce their costs over time by exerting costly effort, i.e., the cost reduction no longer
occurs ‘naturally’ but rather is the result of a supplier’s conscious effort to reduce production
costs (see Laffont and Tirole[23] for excellent survey and study of the investment as an effort
of the cost reduction). Under such a framework, the buyer may use an EPC not only to try
to ‘capture’ some of the cost savings that a supplier accrues, but also as a catalyst for the
supplier to identify and undertake cost-saving effort/action and as a result, we conjecture
that its performance will improve, relative to SI.
1See appendix H for bundled procurement mechanisms under NLI and LI1.
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Second, we studied the case where the buyer uses a sole sourcing strategy, i.e., the buyer
purchases an individual product from a supplier. Alternatively, some buyers prefer to have
multiple sourcing strategies (e.g. when a buyer purchases several products and wants to
keep two suppliers, each of them supplies some portion of the products - 50-50 or 80-20).
Under such a setting, it would be interesting to extend our EPC model to solve the optimal
eroding price schedules according to each supplier’s type and further, the optimal portion
of the business combined with the eroding price contract (Klotz and Chatterjee[19] studied
the design of two sequential auctions when the buyer wants dual sourcing).
Third, we studied two-period model with N potential suppliers. By extending the
periods (T > 2), we can proceed to find the optimal eroding price R(tT−1, T ) under EPC,
which has now an additional dimension of period T . Under the two-period model (i.e., LI1
and LI2), the optimal R(t1) = t1. However, it would no longer optimal for the buyer to
always guarantee nonnegative profit to her incumbent if there are more than 2 periods. In
addition, the buyer may want to renew the eroding price at every period after observing
the bid or the incumbent’s reaction for the given eroding price. This would be a good
complement of Lewis and Yildirim[25] who studied the sequential auctions among 2 suppliers
in infinite time horizon (T = ∞).
Finally (but not the last one), we would consider the capacity constraints in our model
(Elmaghraby[13] studied the sequential auctions where two groups of suppliers exist; one
group has a capacity constraint, while the other group has not). Depending on the supplier’s
capacity, the magnitude of the synergy (e.g. cost reduction due to learning by doing) as
well we the bidding behavior would differ, and hence the buyer would set different eroding
price Rc(t1) for a group with capacity c.
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APPENDIX A
BIDDING STRATEGIES AND THE EXPECTED TOTAL
COSTS UNDER EPC (IN CHAPTER 3 : NLI )
In this appendix, we obtain the bidding strategies and the expected total costs of the buyer
under EPC. Without loss of generality, we analyze the bidding strategy of a bidder of type
t at T = 1. Assume that all bidders, with the possible exception of bidder t, are using
the same bid strategy B(·) at T = 1 and bid as their true types. Given this, we consider
the profit maximization problem for bidder t. We define Π(t, τ) to be the expected profit
of type t submitting bid as type τ at T = 1 (τ = t1 ± δ). In order for the bid function
B(·) to be a symmetric equilibrium bid, the payoff of the bidder t should satisfy the first
order condition at τ = t1, when we consider both τ < t1 and τ > t1. We present below our
analysis when τ < t1 ; the results are identical when τ > t1.
A.1 The equilibrium bidding strategy of a bidder t
A supplier t has three possible positive payoffs streams : when he (a) wins at T = 1 and
(finds it profitable to) accepts R at T = 2, (b) wins at T = 1 and rejects R at T = 2, and
(c) loses at T = 1 and wins at T = 2. We define w1 as the lowest bidder among N − 1
bidders at T = 1 (excluding t1).

























[w2E − t2E ]f(1:N−2)(w2E)f(t2E) dw2E dt2E
where tTS denotes the bidder t at time T as the status of S (i.e., I if he is an incumbent,
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E if he is an entrant), w1 is the lowest bidder among N − 1 bidders excluding bidder t
at T = 1, w2S denotes the bidder w(6= t) at T = 2 as the status of S (i.e., I if he is an
incumbent, E if he is an entrant).
The equilibrium bidding strategy by solving the first order condition (by replacing τ
with t1) is,
B1EPC(t




















A.2 The optimal R∗ and the buyer’s expected total cost
Given the bidding strategy, the buyer’s expected total cost is
ETCEPC(R) = E[B1EPC(t










[w2E − t2E ]f(1:N−2)(w2E)f(t2E) dw2E dt2E


























[w2E − t2E ]f(1:N−2)(w2E)f(t2E) dw2E dt2E
























Let R̂ be the solution of the equation (A.2).
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Now, we check whether R̂ is a global optimal value. To do this, we can simply check







< 0, if R < Λ
= 0, if R = Λ
> 0, if R > Λ





R̂, if C − α ≤ R̂ < C + 1− α
C + 1− α, if R̂ ≥ C + 1− α
(Note that R∗ = C − α can not happen, since R∗ > C − α(∵ E[B2EPC(t2E)(2:N−1) + s] >
C + s > C − α))
Given the optimal R∗, the buyer’s expected total cost is,
(1) If R∗ = C + 1− α,
ETCEPC(R) = E[t1(2:N)] + E[t
2
I ]




(R̂− t2I)fI(t2I) dt2I + FI(R̂)R̂ + (1− FI(R̂))R̂









I + (1− FI(R̂))R̂












∗] under the uni-
form distribution
We show that given the optimal R∗ under the uniform distribution, the supplier t always
shades his bid at T = 1 below his cost t1 even if he considers the expected profit as an
entrant at T = 2 by which he would inflate his bid.
First, when R∗ = C +1−α, supplier t always shades his bid since he always accepts R∗.





















[w2E − t2E ]f(1:N−2)(w2E)f(t2E) dw2E dt2E
Under the uniform distribution, the difference is as follows.
E[Π2EPC(t
2
I); R̂]− E[Π2EPC(t2E); R̂]
=
[





























+ s + α
)2
− 1
N(N − 1) ,
(
← R̂ = 1
N(N − 1) +
2
N































N2 + N − 1
2
]
> 0 (∵ N ≥ 3)
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APPENDIX B
BIDDING STRATEGIES AND THE EXPECTED TOTAL
COSTS UNDER SI (IN CHAPTER 3 : NLI )
B.1 The equilibrium bidding strategy of a bidder t
Supplier t has five possible payoffs : when he (a) wins in both periods and an entrant
defines his payment at T = 2, (b) wins in both periods and the buyer pays her reserve price
r2 = C + 1− α, (c) wins only at T = 1, (d) wins only at T = 2 and an entrant defines his
payment and (e) wins only at T = 2 and the incumbent defines his payment. Note that
the buyer switches her suppliers only when at least one of the entrants’ cost is lower than
incumbent’s cost minus the switching cost s. Without loss of generality, we can obtain the
payoff of supplier t by shifting the cost range of an entrant by s (we use the same method
to obtain the expected total cost at T = 2 of the buyer).
(case1) α + s ≥ 1
When supplier t wins at T = 1, he also wins at T = 2 with probability of 1 and the
payment is the buyer’s reserve price, C + 1 − α (all entrants’ bids ≥ C + s ≥ C + 1 − α).
If he loses at T = 1, the incumbent wI will continue to win at T = 2 with probability of







[B(w1) + r2 − t1 − t2I ] f(1:N−1)(w)fI(t2I) dw dt2I
The equilibrium bidding strategy is,
B1SI(t
1) = t1 − [r2 −E[t2I ]], r2 = C + 1− α
(case2) α + s < 1
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max [C+s, t2I ]
∫ C+1
τ






















































































max [C+s, t2I ]





























B.2 The buyer’s expected total cost
The buyer’s expected cost at T = 2 is as follows.
E[min(B̃2(t2)(2:N), r
2)] = E[t2(2:N) + s|(I, E)]× Pr(I, E) + E[r2|(I, r2)]× Pr(I, r2)
+E[t2(2:N) + s|(E, E)]× Pr(E, E) + E[t2(2:N)|(E, I)]× Pr(E, I),
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where t2(2:N) is the second lowest bid(cost) among N bidders at T = 2(i.e., an incumbent
and N − 1 entrants) and Pr(y, z) is the probability of (who wins, who defines the payment
to the winning supplier) at T = 2, where I, E, and r2 denote an incumbent, an entrant,
and a reserve price at T = 2, respectively. The expected cost at T = 2 is the combination
of the expected cost conditional on the pair of (who wins, who defines the payment).
With the given the bidding strategy, the buyer’s expected total cost is













































We show that the supplier t always shades his bid at T = 1 below his cost t1 even if he
considers the expected profit as an entrant at T = 2 by which he would inflate his bid.







max [C+s, t2I ]




















FI(x) (1− FE(x))N−1 dx
81






















[1− FI(x)] (1− FE(x))N−2 FE(x)dx














FI(x) dx > 0, & FE(x) ≺FSD FI(x))
The last integral is greater than 0 because FE(x) first degree stochastically dominates
(≺FSD) FI(x) (FI(x) and FE(x) are same distribution with different range, but same inter-
vals, i.e., the lowest value of FI(x) < that of FE(x) (this result mirrors to that of Grimm[15]).
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APPENDIX C
BIDDING STRATEGIES AND THE OPTIMAL R∗(T )
UNDER EPC (IN CHAPTER 4: LI1)
C.1 The equilibrium bidding strategy of a bidder t
A supplier t has three possible positive payoffs streams : when he (a) wins at T = 1 and
(finds it profitable to) accepts R(τ) at T = 2, (b) wins at T = 1 and rejects R(τ) at T = 2,
and (c) loses at T = 1 and wins at T = 2. Note that the payment at T = 2, R(τ) is
determined by the bidder t’s reported type τ . Here, we use αt as the maximum possible
cost reduction(i.e., αt is not necessarily same for all type t). For simple notation, we drop
superscript 1 from a supplier’s cost at T = 1.
(case1) τ < t
We consider two cases where (i) t− αt < R(t) ≤ t and (ii) R(t) = t− αt.
(i) t− αt < R(t) ≤ t
By monotonicity of R, R(τ) < R(t) ≤ t. By continuity of R, there exists ε > 0, s.t.


























[w2E − t2E ]f(1:N−2)(w2E)f(t2E) dw2E dt2E
where tTS denotes the bidder t at time T as the status of S (i.e., I if he is an incumbent, E
if he is an entrant), w1 is the lowest bidder among N−1 bidders excluding bidder t at T = 1,
w2S denotes the bidder w(6= t) at T = 2 as the status of S (i.e., I if he is an incumbent,
E if he is an entrant). The buyer’s choice of R(t) for each t ∈ [C, C + 1] is restricted to
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R(t) ∈ [t− αt, t], for each type (i.e., 0 < t−R(τ) < αt and 0 < w −R(w) < αw)1.























[w2E − t2E ]f(1:N−2)(w2E)f(t2E) dw2E dt2E
(ii) R(t) = t− αt
In this case, R(τ) < t − αt = R(t). Thus, the incumbent will always reject R(τ). The




















[w2E − t2E ]f(1:N−2)(w2E)f(t2E) dw2E dt2E (C.3)
After solving the first order condition, the bidding strategy is,





(w2E − t2E)f(1:N−2)(w2E)f(t2E) dw2E dt2E ,
which is same as in equation (E.2) if we plug R(t) = t− αt into the equation.
(case2) τ > t
We have two cases where (iii) t− αt ≤ R(t) < t and (iv) R(t) = t.
(iii) t− αt ≤ R(t) < t
By monotonicity and continuity of R, t − αt ≤ R(t) < R(τ) ≤ t, in which the supplier
t has the same payoff as in (case 1) (i) - equation (E.1), thus the bidding strategy is the
same as in equation (E.2).
(iv) R(t) = t
We have R(t) = t < R(τ). The incumbent always accepts R at T = 2. The payoff
1Note that the buyer selects the schedule of R(t) based on the type (cost) which is no greater than the
type itself (i.e., R(t) ≤ t). The buyer has indifference between to choose R(t) = t − αt and R(t) < t − αt






















[w2E − t2E ]f(1:N−2)(w2E)f(t2E) dw2E dt2E











This is same as in equation (E.2) if we plug R(t) = t into the equation.
C.2 The optimal R∗(t) = kt
The buyer’s expected total cost under EPC is,
ETCEPC(R(t)) ≡ ETCEPC(k) (← R(t) = kt)









































[1− FI(kt)] E[t(2:N−1) + s]f(1:N)(t)dt
~ Under the uniform F and G, the equilibrium bidding strategy of supplier t at T = 1 is,
B1EPC(t) = t− Pr(t2I ≤ R(t))
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where h(t) = 1−F (t)f(t) = 1+C− t, Pr(t2I ≤ R(t)) = FI(R(t)) and E[t2I |t2I ≤ R(t)] = t−α+R(t)2 .
Under the uniform F and G, ETCEPC(k) is a quadratic function of k. We will find
the optimal k = 1 by showing that ETCEPC(k) is decreasing in k under the support of
[1− αC+1 , 1] (in our assumption, R(t) = kt ∈ [t−α, t] ⇒ k ∈ [max(1− αt , ∀t), 1]). Thus, we


































































































































































































(N + 1)(N + 2)
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> 0

























































(N + 1)(N + 2)
− 2
N(N − 1)(N + 1) −
C





















where Ψ = (2− 3C)N2 − (8 + 5C)N + 2C
∂2Ψ
∂N2
= 2(2 − 3C) < 0 (∵ C ≥ 1), and N∗ = 8+5C2(2−3C) < 0, where N∗ maximizes Ψ.
Therefore, for N ≥ 3, Ψ is decreasing in N . Since Ψ = 9(2 − 3C) − 3(8 + 5C) + 2C =
−(6 + 40C) < 0 for N = 3, Ψ < 0 with any N > 3. Therefore, ∂ETCEPC(k)∂k |k=1< 0.
In summary, we showed that ETCEPC(k) is decreasing in k ∈ [1− αC+1 , 1] by showing
that (1) ETCEPC(k) is convex and (2)
∂ETCEPC(k)
∂k |k=1< 0. Therefore, the optimal k which
minimizing ETCEPC(k) is 1.
C.2.1 The optimal R∗(t) = kt with proportional α




















N(N − 1) −
2
N
























N(N − 1) + s
)
< 0
Thus, the quadratic function of ETCEPC(k) is decreasing in k ≤ 1.
C.3 sensitivity of k
We check the sensitivity of the choice of k. That is, how bad the buyer will be if she can






(2− 3C)N2 − (8 + 5C)N + 2C





If α increases, ∂ETCEPC(k)∂k |k=1 decreases. That is, the change of ETCEPC(k) (i.e.,
ETCEPC(k + ε) − ETCEPC(k)) for a unit change of k (i.e., ε) becomes smaller. When N
increases, ∂ETCEPC(k)∂k |k=1 also decreases because the two negative terms in the parenthesis
in equation (C.3) decreases. When s increases, the last two terms in the parenthesis in
equation (C.3) increases, and hence ∂ETCEPC(k)∂k |k=1 increases. In summary, the buyer’s
costs are most sensitive to a change in k when α and N are small and s is large.
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C.4 The buyer’s expected total cost
Given the optimal R∗(t) = t, we have the following buyer’s expected total cost.




























THE PAYOFF FUNCTION OF A BIDDER UNDER SI (IN
CHAPTER 4 : LI1)
The expected profit of bidder t is,
Π(t, τ) =
∫ min[t, τ ]
t−αt
∫ τ
max [C+s, t2I ]
∫ C+1
τ










































































BIDDING STRATEGIES AND THE OPTIMAL R∗(T )
UNDER EPC (IN CHAPTER 5 : LI2)
In this appendix, we analyze the symmetric bidding strategy of a bidder of type t in general
case(i.e., αt differs for different t) under LI2. The procedure to obtain the bid under EPC
is very similar to the case under LI1 (see appendix C). Recall that the magnitude of the
learning effect cost is uncertain, while the operating cost is give by t1 at T = 2. Thus, instead
of FI(t2I) as the incumbent’s cost distribution at T = 2, we use G(α̃t) as the distribution of
the cost reduction : G(0) = 0, and G(αt) = 1, with corresponding probability g (We can
easily interchange FI and G).
E.1 The equilibrium bidding strategy of a bidder t
A supplier t has three possible positive payoffs streams : when he (a) wins at T = 1 and
(finds it profitable to) accepts R(τ) at T = 2, (b) wins at T = 1 and rejects R(τ) at T = 2,
and (c) loses at T = 1 and wins at T = 2. Note that the payment at T = 2 R(τ) is
determined by the bidder t’s reported type τ .
(case1) τ < t
We consider two cases where (i) t− αt < R(t) ≤ t and (ii) R(t) = t− αt.
(i) t− αt < R(t) ≤ t
























[wE − tE ]f(1:N−2)(wE)f(tE) dwE dtE
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Subscriptions, I and E, represent the status of the bidder at T = 2 (Incumbent and
Entrant). For example, wI is the incumbent (other than type t) , wE is the entrant other
than t, and tE is the type t who is entrant at T = 2. α̃wI is the realized cost reduction for the
type wI . The buyer’s choice of R(t) for each t ∈ [C, C + 1] is restricted to R(t) ∈ [t−αt, t],
for each type (i.e., 0 < t−R(τ) < αt and 0 < wI −R(wI) < αwI )1.



















[wE − tE ]f(1:N−2)(wE)f(tE) dwE dtE
(ii) R(t) = t− αt



















[wE − tE ]f(1:N−2)(wE)f(tE) dwE dtE (E.3)
After solving the first order condition, the bidding strategy is,





(wE − tE)f(1:N−2)(wE)f(tE) dwE dtE ,
which is same as in equation (E.2) when R(t) = t− αt.
(case2) τ > t
We have two cases where (iii) t− αt ≤ R(t) < t and (iv) R(t) = t.
(iii) t− αt ≤ R(t) < t
The supplier t has the same payoff as in (case 1) (a) - equation (E.1), thus the bidding
strategy is as in equation (E.2).
1Note that the buyer selects the schedule of R(t) based on the type (cost) which is no greater than the
type, itself (i.e., R(t) ≤ t). And the buyer has indifference between to choose R(t) = t−αt and R(t) < t−αt
which gives the lower bound of R(t).
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(iv) R(t) = t


















[wE − tE ]f(1:N−2)(wE)f(tE) dwE dtE (E.4)
























The last term (E.5) becomes 0 because R(t) = t. And this is same as in equation (E.2) if
we substitute R(t) with t.
E.2 The optimal R∗(t) = kt
The procedure is very similar to that in appendix C.2. First, we take the first derivative of

















































































where Ψ = −CN4 − 3CN3 + (1− 2C)N2 + (2C − 6)N + 4C − 1
∂2Ψ
∂N2
= −6CN(2N + 3) < 0, and ∂Ψ∂N N=3 = −201C + 6 < 0(∵ C ≥ 1). Therefor, Ψ < 0
for any N > 3.
In summary, we showed that ETCEPC(k) is decreasing in k ∈ [1− αC+1 , 1] by showing
that (1) ETCEPC(k) is convex and (2)
∂ETCEPC(k)
∂k |k=1< 0. Therefore, the optimal k which
minimizing ETCEPC(k) is 1.
E.2.1 The optimal R∗(t) = kt with new set of entrants










Given this, we have decreasing convex function as follows.
∂2ETCEPC(k)
∂k2












where Ψ = − [CN2 + CN + 4C + 4]
E.3 The buyer’s expected total cost
Given the optimal R∗(t) = t, the bidding strategy and the the buyer’s expected total cost
as as follows.
B(t) = t− [R(t)− (t− E[α̃])]
= t−E[α̃]








= E[t(2:N)]− E[α̃] + E[t(1:N)]
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E.3.1 The buyer’s expected total cost with new set of entrants
Given the optimal R∗(t) we have the following B(t) and ETC.
B(t) = t− [R(t)− (t−E[α̃])] = t− E[α̃]
ETCEPC(R∗(t)) = E[t(2:N)]−E[α̃] + E[t(1:N)]
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APPENDIX F
BIDDING STRATEGIES UNDER SI (IN CHAPTER 5 :
LI2)
F.1 The equilibrium bidding strategy of a bidder t
Supplier t has the five possible payoffs during the whole procurement stages. The five pos-
sible payoffs cover the cases when supplier t (a) wins in both periods and an entrant defines
his payment at T = 2, (b) wins in both periods and the buyer pays her reserve price r2 = t,
(c) wins only at T = 1, (d) wins only at T = 2 and an entrant defines his payment and (e)
wins only at T = 2 and the incumbent defines his payment. Note that the buyer switches
her suppliers only when at least one of the entrants’ cost is lower than incumbent’s cost
minus switching cost s. Without loss of generality, we can obtain the payoff of supplier
t by shifting the cost range of an entrant by s (we use the same method to obtain the
expected total cost at T = 2 of the buyer) : we use FE as the shifted distribution, i.e.,
FE(C + s) = 0, FE(C + 1 + s) = 1, with corresponding pdf fE .
(case1) τ < t :
(case1-1) t < C + s
When t wins at T = 1, he is also wins at T = 2 with probability of 1 and the payment is
the buyer’s reserve price t (all entrants bids ≥ C +s ≥ t). If t loses at T = 1, the incumbent
wI will also win at T = 2 with probability of 1, and there is no second chance of win for






[B(w) + r2 − 2t + α̃t] f(1:N−1)(w)g(α̃t) dw dα̃t
The bidding strategy from the first order condition with replacing r into t as follows.
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(case1-2) t− αt < C + s < t
First we assume that there exists a certain r s.t C + s < τ < t. The payoff function of








[B(w) + wE − 2t + α̃t] f(1:N−1)(w)×








[B(w) + r2 − 2t + α̃t] f(1:N−1)(w)×



















[wE − tE ] f(1:N−2)(wE)f(tE)× (F.2)










[wI − α̃wI − tE ] f(1:N−2)(wE)f(tE)× (F.3)
g(α̃wI )f(1:N−1)(wI) dwE dtE dα̃wI dwI
Letz(wE , tE , α̃wI wI) = [wE−tE ] f(1:N−2)(wE)f(tE)g(α̃wI )f(1:N−1)(wI) (equation (F.2))
and k(wE , tE , α̃wI wI) = [wI − α̃wI − tE ] f(1:N−2)(wE)f(tE)g(α̃wI )f(1:N−1)(wI) (equation
(F.3)). Depending on whether wI − αwI < C + s or not, the last two payoffs change.
Payoff (F.2)+ payoff (F.3) (note : wI ≥ C + s) :
If wI − C − s < αwI , then min(wI − C − s, αwI ) = wI − C − s(⇒ wI < C + s + αwI )








z(wE , tE , α̃wI wI) dwE dtE dα̃wI dwI
+








k(wE , tE , α̃wI wI) dwE dtE dα̃wI dwI
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If wI − C − s ≥ αwI , then min(wI − C − s, αwI ) = αwI (⇒ wI ≥ C + s + αwI )








z(wE , tE , α̃wI wI) dwE dtE dα̃wI dwI
+








k(wE , tE , α̃wI wI) dwE dtE dα̃wI dwI
Hence,



















k(wE , tE , α̃wI wI) dwE dtE dα̃wI dwI







































k(wE , tE , α̃wI wI) dwE dtE dα̃wI dwI
Combined with the assumption t < C + s + αt, (1) when αt ≤ αwI , then only case (i)
holds (C +s < t < C +s+αt), (2) when αt > αwI , (2-1) with C +s < t < C +s+αwI , case
(i) holds, and (2-2) with C + s + αwI < t < C + s + αt, case (ii) holds. Thus, by solving
the first order condition and replacing τ = t in each case, the equilibrium bidding strategy
of supplier t at T = 1 is
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(t− α̃wI − tE)f(1:N−2)(wE)f(tE)g(α̃wI ) dwE dtE dα̃wI
(where Φ = t− C − s)









































(t− α̃wI − tE)f(1:N−2)(wE)f(tE)g(α̃wI ) dwE dtE dα̃wI
(where Φ = αt : The only difference from B(t) in (F.4) is Φ)
(case1-3) t− αt > C + s
We assume that there exists a certain τ s.t. C + s + αt < τ < t The payoff function of
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[B(w) + wE − 2t + α̃t] f(1:N−1)(w)×








[B(w) + r2 − 2t + α̃t] f(1:N−1)(w)×



















[wE − tE ] f(1:N−2)(wE)f(tE)× (F.6)










[wI − α̃wI − tE ] f(1:N−2)(wE)f(tE)× (F.7)
g(α̃wI )f(1:N−1)(wI) dwE dtE dα̃wI dwI
Payoff (F.6)+ payoff (F.7) : When αt ≤ αwI , with (1) C + s + αt < t < C + s + αwI , it
is same as in case (1-2) (i), and with (2) t ≥ C + s + αwI , it is same as in case (1-2) (ii).
When αt > αwI , with C + s + αt ≤ t, it is same as in case (1-2) (ii).
The equilibrium bidding strategy of supplier t at T = 1 is


































(t− α̃wI − tE)f(1:N−2)(wE)f(tE)g(α̃wI ) dwE dtE dα̃wI
(where Φ = αt)
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(t− α̃wI − tE)f(1:N−2)(wE)f(tE)g(α̃wI ) dwE dtE dα̃wI
(where Φ = t− C − s) : The only difference from B(t) in (F.8) is Φ)
Now we check the boundaries where t = C + s and t = C + s + αt.
(case1-4) t = C + s
(case1-5) t = C + s + αt
(case2) τ > t :
(case2-1) t < C + s
Under the assumption that there exists a certain τ s.t C + s < τ < t, same payoff
function holds as in (case1-1). Thus, the equilibrium bidding strategy of supplier t is (Bid
1) as in equation (F.1).
(case2-2) t− αt < C + s < t
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[B(w) + wE − 2t + α̃t] f(1:N−1)(w)×








[B(w) + r2 − 2t + α̃t] f(1:N−1)(w)×



















[wE − tE ] f(1:N−2)(wE)×










[wI − α̃wI − tE ] f(1:N−2)(wE)×
f(tE)g(α̃wI )f(1:N−1)(wI) dwE dtE dα̃wI dwI
The equilibrium bid is same as in (Bid 2) - (equation (F.4)) and (Bid 3) - (equation
(F.5)).
(case2-3) t− αt > C + s








[B(w) + wE − 2t + α̃t] f(1:N−1)(w)×








[B(w) + r2 − 2t + α̃t] f(1:N−1)(w)×



















[wE − tE ] f(1:N−2)(wE)f(tE)×










[wI − α̃wI − tE ] f(1:N−2)(wE)f(tE)×
g(α̃wI )f(1:N−1)(wI) dwE dtE dα̃wI dwI
The equilibrium bid is same as in (Bid 4) - (equation (F.8)) and (Bid 5) - (equation
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(F.9)).
(case2-4) t = C + s
(case2-5) t = C + s + αt





t− ∫ αt0 α̃tg(α̃t) dα̃t, when C ≤ t < C + s
U1(t) + V1(t), when C + s < t < C + s + αwI , αt > αwI ,
or C + s < t < C + s + αt, αt ≤ αwI
U1(t) + V2(t), when C + s + αwI ≤ t < C + s + αt
U2(t) + V1(t), when C + s + αt < t < C + s + αwI
U2(t) + V2(t), when C + s + αt < t, αt > αwI ,








































































F.2 Monotonicity of SI
We show B(t) is strict monotone under the uniform distribution.

















− (1+C+s−t+α)N−(1+C+s−t)NαN(N−1) + 1N(N−1) if C + s + α ≤ t
When t < C + s,
∂B(t)
∂t
= 1 > 0
When C + s ≤ t < C + s + α,
∂B(t)
∂t







αN(N − 1) −
(1 + C + s− t)N−1
α(N − 1)
= 1− (1 + C + s− t)N−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
+




1− (1 + C + s− t)N−1
α(N − 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
> 0
When C + s + α ≤ t,
∂B(t)
∂t
= 1− (1 + C + s− t)N−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
+
(1 + C + s− t + α)N−1 − (1 + C + s− t)N−1





PROOF OF STRICT MONOTONICITY OF B1M(T ) UNDER
EPC WHEN THE BUYER USES DISCRIMINATORY R(T )
(IN CHAPTER 4 : LI1)
In chapter 4.4.1, we examined the optimal “discriminatory” eroding schedule R(t). We
prove that there exists a B(t) which is strictly monotonically increasing in t in equilibrium
under the following assumptions1 :
ASSUMPTION G.1. R(t) ∈ [t− αt, t] ∀ t.
ASSUMPTION G.2. R(t) is differentiable everywhere and is strictly monotonically in-
creasing in t.
The first assumption is already mentioned in the main content. The second assumption
was not necessary when R(t) = kt (nondiscriminatory). However, for us to solve the optimal
discriminatory R(t), we make the assumption G.2. This assumption is a mild one that
states that a buyer would never require a lower price from a higher type t; this assumption
is particularly reasonable since the suppliers are assumed to have no control on their cost
reduction α̃t, i.e., the cost reduction arises merely out of having supplied the buyer once
before and is not a direct result of any cost-saving measures.
For simplicity, we use B(t) instead of B1M (t) in this chapter. We proceed by proving
that (Claim 1 ) B(t) is strictly monotonic in t, and then (Claim 2 ) B(t) is increasing in t.
G.1 EPC
Proof. We define Π(t, τ) to be the expected profit of type t submitting a bid as type r. We
separate Π(t, τ) into three cases; (i) bidder t wins at T = 1 and accepts R(t) at T = 2; (ii)
1Note that the proof here does not guarantee that B(t) in equation (4.1) are always strict increasing in t.
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bidder t wins at T = 1 and rejects R(t) at T = 2 and (iii) bidder t loses at T = 1 (details
are in the appendix E).
(Claim 1 ) Suppose that B(t) is not strictly monotonic in t. Then, ∃ t1, t2 s.t., for
t1 < t2, (i.e., t2 − t1 < ε where 0 < ε ≤ δ)2, B(t1) = B(t2). Suppose that bidder t1 bids as
type t2. Consider case (i): If bidder t1 wins at T = 1 with bid B(t1), then he will win with
a bid of B(t2) and will be paid R(t2) at T = 2, which is strictly greater than R(t1), hence
bidder t1 is strictly better off bidding as type t2. Under case (ii), bidder t1 rejects R(t1);
however, under assumptions 1 and 2, he will accept R(t2) with positive probability hence
is strictly better off bidding as type t2. Under case (iii), if bidder t1 loses at T = 1 with
bid B(t1), then he will lose with a bid B(t2). Since he redraws costs at T = 2, his expected
profits at T = 2 are the same under either bid, making him indifferent to bidding as type
t1 or t2. When combining all three cases, bidder t1 is strictly better off bidding as type t2
and hence B(t1) could not have been part of an equilibrium bidding strategy.
(Claim 2 ) We assume that B(t) is decreasing in t and consider the expected profits of
two types, C and C + ε (ε > 0). First, suppose Π(C, C) > Π(C + ε, C + ε). Since B(C)
is the highest bid, bidder C will always lose at T = 1. Hence the expected profit can be
positive only when he wins at T = 2 as an entrant (where his cost is newly drawn), which
implies that Π(C, C) = Π(C + ε, C) (any bidder who submits a bid of B(C) faces the same
expected profit in both auctions). Hence, type C + ε is strictly better off changing his bid
to B(C) (because, by assumption, Π(C + ε, C + ε) < Π(C, C) = Π(C + ε, C)). This is a
contradiction and therefore Π(C, C) ≤ Π(C + ε, C + ε).
Second, we argue that Π(C + ε, C + ε) < Π(C, C + ε). Any type that submits a bid
of B(C + ε) has a positive (epsilonic) probability that he will win at T = 1. That, in
combination that the payment at T = 2 is same for any type who bids as type C + ε(i.e.,
R(C + ε)), implies that bidder C must have a higher expected profit T = 2 when he bids
B(C + ε) at T = 1, than bidder C + ε, i.e., Π(C + ε, C + ε) < Π(C, C + ε). Combining these
two inequalities on expected profit implies that Π(C, C) ≤ Π(C + ε, C + ε) < Π(C, C + ε).
Therefore, under the assumption that B(t) is strictly decreasing in t, type C would be
2We consider local optima and hence local perturbations from t
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strictly better off deviating from his true type bid B(C) and bidding B(C + ε). Hence, B(t)
must be strictly increasing in equilibrium.
G.2 BEPC
Notice that we can also simply obtain the bid under the bundled auction coupled with
eroding price schedule under LI1 similar to the case under LI2. In appendix H, we derive
the bidding strategy under BEPC in LI1. We prove that there also exists a strict monotone
B(t) with discriminatory R(t).
Proof. Hence, Π(t, τ) = E[B(1:N−1)(w) + R(τ) − 2t + α̃t | B(τ) < B(1:N−1)(w)]Pr(B(τ) <
B(1:N−1)), where B(w)(1:N−1) is the lowest bid among N − 1 bidders except bidder t.
(Claim 1 ) Suppose that B(t) is not strictly monotonic in t. Then, ∃ t1, t2 s.t., for
t1 < t2, (i.e., t2 − t1 < ε where 0 < ε ≤ δ) B(t1) = B(t2). If bidder t1 submits a bid as type
t2, B(t2), then his probability of winning and expected payment at T = 1 remain the same,
whereas the payment at T = 2 increases, under assumption 1 (R(t2) > R(t1)). Therefore
he is strictly better off choosing B(t2) (Π(t1, t1) < Π(t1, t2)). Hence B(t1) could not have
been part of an equilibrium bidding strategy.
(Claim 2 ) Since B(t) is strictly monotonic in t, B(t) will be either increasing or de-
creasing in t. Suppose that B(t) is decreasing in t. We argue that type C (the lowest type)
is strictly better off choosing a higher type’s bid (i.e., C + ε, where B(C + ε) < B(C),
ε > 0). Π(C, C) is 0 because supplier C always loses at T = 1. If he were to bid B(C + ε),
however, he would win with a positive probability at T = 1. That, in the combination of
assumptions 1 and 2, implies that type C would be strictly better off deviating from his
true type bid B(C) and bidding B(C + ε) (Π(C, C) < Π(C,C + ε)). Hence, B(t) must be
strictly increasing in equilibrium.
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APPENDIX H
THE EQUIVALENCE BETWEEN BUNDLED
PROCUREMENT MECHANISMS UNDER NLI AND LI1
In section 5.4.4, we discussed the bundled procurement mechanisms : an auction coupled
with the eroding price schedule(BEPC) and a bundle auction(BA) under LI2. In this section,
we examine the same bundled procurement mechanisms under other two models, NLI and
LI1. Different from LI2, we show that these two mechanisms yield the same outcome to the
buyer.
H.1 Bundled procurement mechanisms under NLI
PROPOSITION H.1. Given a supplier market characterized by (N,α, s), the buyer’s
expected total cost is independent of the choice of R under BEPC.







[B(w1) + R− t1 − t2I ] f(1:N−1)(w1)fI(t2I) dw1 dt2I
B1BEPC(t























PROPOSITION H.2. The buyer’s expected cost is the same under BEPC and BA.






















The expected total cost of the buyer is as follows.
ETCBA = 2 ∗ E[B1BA(t1)(2:N)]
= E[t1(2:N)] + E[t
2
I ]
Thus, the buyer’s expected total cost by bundling is the same as her cost under EPC
with R = C + 1− α.
H.2 Bundled procurement mechanisms under LI1
PROPOSITION H.3. Given a supplier market characterized by (N,α, s), the buyer’s
expected total cost when using a non-discriminatory price schedule, i.e., R(t) = kt is the
same for any k under BEPC.






















The expected total cost of the buyer is as follows.














f(2:N)(t) + ktf(1:N)(t) dt




PROPOSITION H.4. The buyer’s expected cost is the same under BEPC and BA.






[2B(w)− 2t + α̃t] f(1:N−1)(w)g(α̃t) dw dα̃t
B1BA(t











= E[t1(2:N)] + E[t
2
I(2:N)]
Thus, the buyer’s expected total cost by bundling is the same as her cost under EPC.
These propositions H.3 and H.4 also apply to the supplier’s payoff.
PROPOSITION H.5. Supplier t’s expected profit is the same for any k in BEPC and
BA and is given by,
ΠktFE(t) = ΠBA(t) =
∫ C+1
t
2(1− F (x))N−1 dx (H.1)
Proof. First, we show that the bidder t’s expected profits with different ks in FE are same.
If we substitute B1FE(t) into B(w) in bidder t’s payoff function, we have the following












































2(1− F (w))N−1 dw
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ΠktFE(t) does not depend on k. In BA, the bidder t’s expected profit, ΠBA(t), given B(t) =
t− 12
∫ α
















2(1− F (w))N−1 dw
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APPENDIX I
EFFICIENCY OF EACH PROCUREMENT MECHANISM
A procurement mechanism is ex post “efficient” if the lowest effective supplier wins the
contract. That is, if there is the case where the buyer switches her suppliers, the supplier
should be the one whose cost plus switching cost is less than the incumbent supplier. In that
sense, SI is always efficient. The other mechanisms are needed to check the probability that
the lowest effective cost supplier becomes the actual supplier at T = 2. In this appendix,
we derive the probability that EPC is efficient under NLI, LI1 and LI2 settings.
I.1 EPC under NLI
Under NLI, there are two cases in which the lowest effective supplier wins at T = 2; (a)
the incumbent accepts R(tI) (tI ≤ R(tI)), and his cost is less than the effective cost of any
other entrants (tI < tE), and (b) the incumbent rejects R(tI) (tI > R(tI)), and the effective
cost of an entrant is less than the incumbent’s cost (tI > tE). Note that the effective cost of
an entrant is his cost plus switching cost s. The probability of the procurement mechanism
being efficient is,
(1) when α + s ≥ 1,
∫ R∗
C−α
fI(x) dx = 1 (∵ R∗ = C + 1− α)
























Table I.1 illustrates the efficiency of EPC.
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Table I.1: Efficiency of EPC under NLI(%)
s = 0.1 α = 0.1
α  N 3 4 5 10 20 s  N 3 4 5 10 20
0.1 53.1 65.2 73.0 87.0 93.6 0.1 53.1 65.2 73.0 87.0 93.6
0.3 71.2 65.8 73.2 87.0 93.6 0.3 71.2 65.8 73.2 87.0 93.6
0.5 86.1 81.8 78.4 87.1 93.6 0.5 86.1 81.8 78.4 87.1 93.6
0.7 96.3 94.8 93.4 88.9 93.6 0.7 96.3 94.8 93.4 88.9 93.6
I.2 EPC with the non-discriminatory R(t) under LI1 and
LI2
Under LI1, R∗(t1) = t1. That is, the incumbent always supplies the buyer at T = 2. To
be the incumbent is the efficient supplier, this incumbent’s cost should be indeed less than
any other (potential) entrants’ effective cost : tI − α̃I < tE , where tI − α̃I is the incumbent
realized cost at T = 2. The probability of the procurement mechanism being efficient is,












f(1:N−1)(tE)g(α̃I)f(1:N)(tI) dtE dα̃I dtI







f(1:N−1)(tE)g(α̃I)f(1:N)(tI) dtE dα̃I dtI






FE(1:N−1)(tI − α̃I)g(α̃I)fI(1:N)(tI) dα̃I dtI
< 1
Table I.2 illustrates the efficiency of EPC.
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Table I.2: Efficiency of EPC under LI1(%)
s = 0.1 α = 0.1
α  N 3 4 5 10 20 s  N 3 4 5 10 20
0.1 77.2 78.7 80.7 89.8 97.3 0.1 77.2 78.7 80.7 89.8 97.3
0.3 84.9 86.9 89.0 95.5 99.0 0.3 91.7 93.9 95.7 99.4 100.0
0.5 89.6 91.3 92.9 97.3 99.4 0.5 97.9 98.9 99.4 100.0 100.0
0.7 92.4 93.8 94.9 98.0 99.6 0.7 99.8 99.9 100.0 100.0 100.0
I.3 EPC with the optimal discriminatory R(t) under LI2
and LI2
Under the optimal discriminatory EPC, there are two cases in which the lowest effective
supplier wins at T = 2; (a) the incumbent accepts R(tI) (I−α̃I ≤ R(tI)), and his cost is less
than the effective cost of any other entrants (I− α̃I < tE +s), and (b) the incumbent rejects
R(tI) (tI − α̃I > R(tI)), and the effective cost of an entrant is less than the incumbent’s
cost (tI − α̃I > tE + s). The probability of the procurement mechanism being efficient is,




















f(1:N−1)(tE)g(α̃I)f(1:N)(tI) dtE dα̃I dtI















f(1:N−1)(tE)g(α̃I)f(1:N)(tI) dtE dα̃I dtI
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APPENDIX J
THE OPTIMAL RESERVE PRICES (IN CHAPTER 6)
J.1 Supplier’s expected profit at T = 2
Supplier t’s expected profits at T = 2 as an incumbent (E[Π2(t2I)]) and an entrant (E[Π
2(t2E)]),
given the buyer’s reserve prices r2I , r
2
E are as follows.












































[wE − tE ] fE(tE)fE(1:N−2)(wE)fI(wI) dtE dwE dwI












































[wE − tE ] fE(tE)fE(1:N−2)(wE)fI(wI) dtE dwE dwI
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J.2 Buyer’s expected cost








ETCOPT (r) = EC1(r1, r2I , r
2
E) + (1− p0(r1))EC21 (r2I , r2E) + p0(r1)EC20 (r20),
We show the explicit function of each expected cost in each period, EC1, EC20 , and
EC21 . We start with EC
2
0 since we can easily obtain the optimal r
2
0 from Lemma 6.1. The








+(C + 1 + s) [1− FE(1:N)(r20)]
Facing the asymmetric bidders, if there is an incumbent, the buyer faces six cases for
EC21 ; (a) an incumbent wins, and an entrant defines the payment, (b) an incumbent wins,
and he receives the reservation price r2I , (c) an entrant wins, and an incumbent defines, (d)
an entrant wins, and he receives the reservation price r2E , (e) an entrant wins, and other
entrant defines, and (f) there is no winners among N suppliers and the buyer incurs an
opportunity cost. We assume that C − α ≤ r2I ≤ C + 1 − α and C + s ≤ r2E ≤ C + 1 + s.
The probability who wins and who defines the payment differs depending on the relative






















































(C + 1 + s) fE(1:N−1)(tE)fI(tI) dtE dtI


















































(C + 1 + s) fE(1:N−1)(tE)fI(tI) dtE dtI
The fifth and sixth integral terms are the case (e) in both rI ≤ rE and rI > rE .
At T = 1, the buyer faces symmetric bidders with the bidding strategy of B1OPT (t
1).
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B1OPT (w) f(2:N)(w) dw
+NB1OPT (r
1)F (r1)[1− F(1:N−1)(r1)]
+(C + 1) [1− F(1:N)(r1)]
Note that B1OPT (w
1) = w1 − E[Π2(w2I )] + E[Π21(w2E)] (p0 = 0) since w1 < r1, and the
reservation payment is B1OPT (r




OPTIMAL INDEPENDENT SEQUENTIAL AUCTIONS
In chapter 6, we obtained the optimal reserve prices in sequential auctions. Since the basic
idea is very similar to obtain the optimal independent sequential auctions, we study the
optimal independent sequential auctions (as we can see later, this optimal independent se-
quential auctions is not the optimal mechanism in our model). Under a regularity condition
that t + F (t)f(t) is a monotone strictly increasing function of t for all t, the optimal indepen-
dent sequential auctions can be obtained by finding the appropriate reserve prices under
Vickrery auctions. However, the buyer sets the reserve price in each period to minimize
the buyer’s expected cost in each period, which differs from OPT in section 6.1. We will
see how to obtain the optimal independent sequential auctions and why it can not be the
optimal mechanism in our model. Our work is based on Sorensen[40]1.
K.1 The Optimal Independent Sequential Auctions (OPT-
SI)
In the design of the optimal mechanisms for independent sequential auctions, the buyer
concerns only each period at one time, i.e., the optimal design of auction is restricted to
minimize the each expected cost at each period. That is, at T = 1, the buyer focuses
on the design of the optimal auction only for T = 1. At T = 2, the buyer designs the
optimal auction for T = 2 given the outcome of the first optimal auction(i.e., allocation
and the payment). Thus, the buyer designs the optimal auction only for the period which
she currently faces. Since the second optimal auction depends on the allocation of the first
optimal auction, we first characterize the second optimal auction.
Even if the auction designs at T = 1 and 2 are independent, the second auction design
1Levin[24] and Cripps and Ireland[10] also studies the optimal auctions for complementary goods.
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depends on the outcome at T = 1 :
• no incumbent at T = 2 The buyer does not purchase at T = 1 from N suppliers (sym-
metric bidders at T = 2)
• an incumbent at T = 2 The buyer purchases at T = 1 from one of N suppliers (asym-
metric bidders at T = 2)
When there is no incumbent at T = 2, the buyer faces N symmetric bidders and this





= OC2 = C + 1 + s (opportunity cost of the buyer)
When there is an incumbent at T = 2, it is also the Vickrery auction with two different









= OC2 = C + 1 + s,
At T = 1, the buyer faces N symmetric bidders. This is also the standard optimal
auction except that the bidder’s reported type is same as his willingness to be paid at
T = 1. That is, bidder t’s reported type is below his cost by amount of the expected profit









where p0(t) is the probability that the bidder t faces N − 1 entrants (there is no incumbent
at T = 2), [E[Π2(tI)] is the expected profit as an incumbent of bidder t, E0[Π2(tE)] the
expected profit as an entrant if there is no incumbent, E1[Π2(tE)] the expected profit as an
entrant if there is an incumbent.
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A bidder t’s virtual type is
c(t) = t−Eπ2 + F (t)
f(t)
The optimal auction is same as the Vicrery auction(since it is the symmetric case and
Eπ2 is a constant, the payment is simply the second order statistics of t−Eπ2 if it is below





Figure K.1: t and the virtual type
The fact that there always exists an incumbent at T = 2 for a marginal bidder t = r1(i.e.,
p0 = 0), with combination that c(t) is increasing in t (see figure K.12), enables us to
2The virtual type of bidder t is
c(t) =
{
t− E[Π2(tI) | I] + E[Π2(tE) | 1] + F (t)f(t) , if t ≤ r1
t− Eπ2 + F (t)
f(t)
, if t > r1
c(t) is increasing function since c(t) if t > r1 is greater than that if t ≤ r1 as follows.
t− [E[Π2(tI) | I] + E[Π2(tE) | 1] + p0
(





≥ t− [E[Π2(tI) | I] + E[Π2(tE) | 1] + F (t)
f(t)
(∵ E[Π2(tE) | 0] ≥ E[Π2(tE) | 1])
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characterize the reserve price r1 as follows.
r1 − E[Π2(tI)] + E1[Π2(tE)] + F (r
1)
f(r1)
= OC1 = C + 1
K.2 Examples with Uniform Distribution
Under uniform distribution,




r2I = = C +
1 + s− α
2
(K.2)




r1 = C +
1
2
+ E[Π2(tI)]− E1[Π2(tE)] (K.4)
Note that the buyer favors an incumbent, if there is an incumbent at T = 2 :
Pr(tI ≤ r2I ) =
OC2 − C + α
2
>
OC2 − C − s
2
= Pr(tE ≤ r2E)
The inverse function of the virtual types of an incumbent and entrants are








Given the reserve prices (equations (K.1)), the buyer’s expected total cost at T = 2, if






+ OC2 [1− FE(1:N)(r20)]
Given the reserve prices (equations (K.2) and (K.3)) and the inverse function of virtual
costs of an incumbent and entrants (equations (K.5) and (K.6)), the buyer’s expected total
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cost at T = 2, if there is an incumbent is,
EC21 =





































fE(tE)fE(1:N−2)(wE)fI(tI) dtE dwE dtI︸ ︷︷ ︸








r2E (N − 1)fE(tE)fE(1:N−2)(wE)fI(tI) dtE dwE dtI
︸ ︷︷ ︸




∫ min[tI+ α+s2 ,r2E ]
C+s
wE fE(2:N−1)(wE)fI(tI) dtE dtI
︸ ︷︷ ︸






OC2 fE(1:N−1)(tE)fI(tI) dtE dtI
︸ ︷︷ ︸
pi(ti)=0: no winning bidder
Note that the payment to the winner is the second lowest virtual cost, not the second
lowest cost as in the symmetric case.
Given the reserve prices (equations (K.4)) and the expected profit of bidder t at T = 2,
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(w − [E[Π2(tI)] + E1[Π2(tE)]) f(2:N)(w) dw
+ N(r1 − [E[Π2(tI)] + E1[Π2(tE)])F (r1)[1− F(1:N−1)(r1)]
+ OC1 [1− F(1:N)(r1)]
Hence, the buyer’s expected total cost is a summation of the outcomes of two independent
optimal auctions.
ETC = EC1 + p0EC20 + (1− p0)EC21
The difference between the optimal independent sequential auctions(OPT-SI) and the
optimal reserve price(OPT) in chapter 6 is clear. In the optimal independent sequential
auctions, the buyer is only interested in minimizing her expected cost in each period. By
this, the optimal reserve prices are simply obtained by Myerson[34] without the knowledge
of the expected cost. So in optimal independent sequential auction, the buyer first find the
optimal reserve prices, and then obtain the expected total cost given the optimal reserve
prices. In contrast, under OPT in chapter 6, the reserve prices are correlated with each
other, and the buyer finds the optimal reserve prices given the expected total cost.
As we will see, by the independence in current optimal auctions, the buyer fails to fully
control over the bidding behavior at T = 1. This effect is substantial, so that even a simple
SI can outperform OPT-SI. Table K.1 illustrates some examples.
3The expected profits of bidder t as an incumbent and an entrant at T = 2 are
E[Π2(tI)] =



















(r2I − tI) fE(1:N−1)(wE)fI(tI) dwE dtI
E1[Π
2(tE)] =


































(wE − tE)fE(tE)fE(1:N−2)(wE)fI(wI) dtE dwE dwI
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Table K.1: Comparisons between the OPT-SI and SI
Market Reserve Prices Comparison of Expected Costs









4 1.527 1.450 1.600 0.050 -6.3 -4.4 2.0 1.7 -2.0
6 1.520 1.450 1.600 0.012 -5.2 -3.6 1.8 1.7 -1.6
8 0.2 0.1 1.516 1.450 1.600 0.003 -4.9 -2.8 1.8 1.8 -1.3
10 1.514 1.450 1.600 0.001 -4.5 -2.4 1.8 1.8 -1.2
20 1.510 1.450 1.600 0.000 -4.0 -1.2 1.9 1.9 -0.9
0.05 1.512 1.525 1.600 0.057 -1.9 -1.8 1.1 0.9 -0.4
0.1 1.517 1.500 1.600 0.054 -3.1 -2.6 1.4 1.2 -0.8
4 0.2 0.1 1.527 1.450 1.600 0.050 -6.3 -4.4 2.0 1.7 -2.0
0.3 1.539 1.400 1.600 0.045 -9.9 -6.4 3.3 2.8 -3.0
0.4 1.552 1.350 1.600 0.040 -14.0 -8.6 4.6 4.0 -4.1
0.5 1.566 1.300 1.600 0.035 -18.6 -11.1 6.0 5.4 -5.2
0.05 1.522 1.425 1.550 0.052 -4.5 -3.6 1.7 1.4 -1.4
0.1 1.527 1.450 1.600 0.050 -6.3 -4.4 2.0 1.7 -2.0
4 0.2 0.2 1.539 1.500 1.700 0.045 -9.9 -5.9 3.0 2.6 -2.9
0.3 1.552 1.550 1.800 0.040 -14.2 -7.5 4.0 3.5 -3.9
0.4 1.567 1.600 1.900 0.035 -18.5 -9.1 5.0 4.5 -4.6

















(%), ∆ = ETCSI−ETC(OPT−SI)ETC(OPT−SI) (%)
The expected cost at T = 2, if there is an incumbent, EC21 is always lower than the
expected cost at T = 2 under SI (see ∆21 in table K.1). This is straightforward in the sense
that at T = 2 OPT-SI and SI are exactly same, and under OPT-SI, the buyer finds the
“optimal” reserve prices.
The expected cost at T = 2, if there is no incumbent, EC20 would be greater (or smaller)
than the expected cost at T = 2 under SI (see ∆20 in table K.1). under OPT-SI, the buyer
faces N symmetric bidders with cost distribution of [C + s, C + 1 + s]. When α and s
are small, OPT-SI and SI would be very similar (if α = s = 0, both become identical),
and hence EC20 is less than the expected cost under SI (e.g. when N = 3, α = s = 0.01,
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∆20 = 1.6). However, with increasing α and s, the incumbent has lower cost distribution
than entrant’s under SI, and hence SI would take advantage of this.
The expected cost at T = 1 EC1 would be greater (or smaller) than the expected cost
at T = 1 under SI. When α and s are small, EC1 would be smaller than the expected cost
under SI (e.g., when N = 3, α = s = 0.01, ∆1 = 0.7). However, as α and s increases, it
is no longer the case. This is because the reported cost under OPT-SI is greater than the
bid under SI. Bidders under OPT-SI at T = 1 should take into account the possibility that
there would be no winner at T = 1.
Overall, OPT-SI does not actually give the optimal solution to the buyer in our model.
This is because that the buyer designs the optimal auction only for each period. In this
case, the optimal auction benefits the buyer at T = 2 because the buyer always designs
the optimal auction according to the outcome at T = 1. However, at T = 1, the bidder’s
reporting cost (virtual cost) is actually greater than the bid under SI - the bidder does not
fully discount his cost under OPT-SI because with positive probability, the buyer does not
purchase at T = 14.
4As further step, we can change the model slightly :
• the buyer wants to minimizes her expected total cost at T = 1 and 2 as a whole. However, she does
not control the second period beforehand. Instead, she finds the optimal reserve price at T = 1 which
minimizes the expected total cost at T = 1 and 2 (ETC). That is, r2, r2I , and r
2
E are same as under
OPT-SI.
• the buyer commits the reserve price at T = 2 in the first auction. The buyer tries to control the
bidder’s reported cost(virtual cost) at T = 1 by announcing the reserve prices at T = 2 in the first
period (in above design, the buyer could not control the bidder’s virtual cost at T = 1). Thus, the
buyer finds the optimal reserve prices at T = 1 and 2 at the same time which minimize the buyer’s
expected total cost at T = 1 and 2.
The optimal reserve price r1 in the first case would result; (a) the buyer’s expected cost at T = 1 (EC1)
would be greater than that under OPT-SI, but (b) the buyer’s expected cost at T = 2 (p0EC
2
0 +(1−p0)EC21 )
would be less than that under OPT-SI. Especially, (b) would dominate (a) effect which makes the buyer
better off from OPT-SI. The last case would results the better outcome because the buyer chooses the
optimal reserve prices r2I , r
2
E and r
1 by considering to minimize ETC. However, it still does not give the
better performance than other procurement mechanisms.
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